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SUMMARY
The objective of this research is to design an energy efficient, secure and noise robust
deep learning system for the Internet of Things (IoTs). The research particularly focuses on
energy efficient training of deep learning, adversarial machine learning, and noise robust
deep learning. To enable energy efficient training of deep learning, the research studies im-
pact of a limited precision training of various types of neural networks like convolutional
neural networks (CNNs) and recurrent neural networks (RNNs). For CNNs, the work pro-
poses dynamic precision scaling algorithm, and precision flexible computing unit to accel-
erate CNNs training. For RNNs, the work studies impact of various hyper-parameters to
enable low precision training of RNNs and proposes low precision computing unit with
stochastic rounding. To enhance the security of deep learning, the research proposes cas-
cade adversarial machine learning and additional regularization using a unified embedding
for image classification and low level (pixel level) similarity learning. Noise robust and
resolution-invariant image classification is also achieved by adding this low level similar-
ity learning. Mixture of pre-processing experts model is proposed for noise robust object




Deep learning [1] has been very successful in many scientific domains such as image clas-
sification [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], image segmentation [8], image caption generation [9], machine
translation [10, 11, 12], speech recognition [13, 14], and even games [15, 16]. Meanwhile,
with a growing interest of deploying IoT devices and ever increasing data created from
those devices, there is a need to shift deep learning computation from the cloud to the edge.
There are several obstacles to overcome for the successful deep learning development and
deployment for the internet of things.
First, fast and energy efficient training of deep learning is necessary to achieve realistic
training time and to minimize power dissipation. Recent deep learning advances have been
enabled by the enormous data set and gigantic deep learning models at the expense of in-
creased training time. As deeper models tend to produce better performance, computational
demand is getting more increased. Many prior works have proposed to use low precision
arithmetic to accelerate the computation at the expense of the accuracy drop of a model.
Majority of the works have studied the impact of low precision for convolutional neural
networks (CNNs) [17] inference. Those works have leveraged quantization error tolerant
characteristics of the neural networks. However, use of low precision arithmetic for the in-
ference does not guarantee the feasibility of the low precision training. Thus, further study
is necessary to speed up deep learning training and to improve the energy efficiency at the
same time.
With a growing interest in sensor data monitoring, recurrent neural networks (RNNs)
[18, 19] are heavily used as these networks are good for dealing with time series data.
Unlike CNNs, RNNs require more computation to train than feed-forward networks due
to the vanishing and exploding gradient problems [20]. To address this challenge, various
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hardware approaches have been proposed for efficient computation of RNN models [21,
22]. Yet, many prior work use low precision only in the forward pass, requiring floating
point precision for updating the parameters during backward propagation. Further study is
also necessary for RNNs to enable entire low precision training for both forward pass and
backward pass.
Second, security of the deep learning against potential adversarial attacks has to be
enhanced. Recent works [23, 24, 25] have shown that todays deep neural networks are
vulnerable to the inputs carefully generated by the adversaries. Most times, those inputs
are not distinguishable to the human eyes, thus, it is possible that the system fails without
producing noticeable changes. This reveals an astonishing difference in the information
processing of humans and machines and raises security concerns for many deployed ma-
chine vision systems.
Injecting adversarial examples during training (adversarial training), [23, 24, 25] in-
creases the robustness of a network against adversarial attacks. The networks trained with
adversarial examples have shown noticeable robustness against the same type of adversar-
ial attacks used in training. However it is shown to be very difficult to enhance robustness
against unknown attacks at test time. Countermeasures for all types of adversarial attacks
are necessary to design practical system of deep learning for the safe critical applications
like autonomous driving vehicles.
Finally, noise robust and resolution-invariant computer vision is also an essential in-
gredient for successful deep learning deployment for the IoTs especially for the edge de-
vices under stingy energy budget. For power hungry edge devices, it is critical to manage
the trade-off between energy and quality of the captured image. Region of interest (RoI)
based coding is becoming a norm for controlling the energy quality trade-off in resource
constraint edge devices [26]. Also, inherent image sensor noise has to be considered for
successful image classification for low-end devices [27]. Energy efficient and noise robust
object detection network is necessary for object tracking on an edge device for round-the-
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clock out door application.
The goal of this research is to design an energy-efficient, secure and noise robust deep
learning for the IoTs. The research particularly focuses on energy efficient training of
deep learning, adversarial machine learning, and noise robust deep learning. To increase
the energy efficiency of the deep learning training, the research first proposes dynamic
precision scaling algorithm for efficient training of convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
and precision flexible multiplier-accumulator (MAC) unit. Limited precision training of
recurrent neural networks (RNNs) is also studied. The work studies impact of various
hyper-parameters to enable low precision training of RNNs and proposes low precision
computing unit with stochastic rounding. The research also proposes cascade adversarial
machine learning technique regularized with a unified embedding for image classification
and low-level similarity learning to make deep learning robust against adversarial attacks.
Noise robust and resolution-invariant image classification is realized by applying low-level
similarity learning. The work proposes use of mixture of pre-processing experts model to
enhance noise robustness for the object detection problem.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, the detailed background and
literature survey are presented. Chapter 3 presents techniques to accelerate CNNs training.
Chapter 4 presents the study of low precision training of RNNs. Chapter 5 introduces
techniques to enhance robustness of machine learning against adversarial attacks. Chapter 6
presents noise-robust and resolution-invariant algorithms for image classification. Chapter
7 presents an algorithm to enhance noise robustness for an object detection network without
sacrificing detection accuracy for normal clean images. Finally, Chapter 8 describes the key




2.1 Energy Efficient Deep Learning
Deep neural networks [1] can be divided into two categories, feed-forward neural networks
wherein connections between the units do not form a cycle and recurrent neural networks
(RNNs) where connections between units form a directed graph. Among feed-forward
neural networks, this thesis focuses on convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [17] since
majority of breakthroughs in many machine learning tasks were enabled by CNNs. For
recurrent neural networks, the study doesn’t consider vanilla RNN since training vanilla
RNN is known to be difficult due to gradient vanishing problem [20]. Rather, the research
considers long-short-term memory (LSTM) [18] and gated recurrent unit (GRU) [19] as
target RNNs since their advanced architecture eased difficulty of training, thus, now those
are gaining popularity.
There have been many works to improve energy efficiency of deep learning. Prior
works to improve energy efficiency can be divided into four categories, algorithms for
efficient inference, hardware for efficient inference, algorithms for efficient training and
hardware for efficient training.
2.1.1 Algorithms for Efficient Inference
Feed-Forward Neural Networks
As the networks becomes deeper and deeper [4], memory bandwidth and convolution com-
putation becomes bottleneck in CNN, thus, many prior works have been proposed to opti-
mize convolution operation and/or memory requirements.
[28] proposed the method to squeeze the weights of the neural networks for efficient
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inference. In their work, they first pruned unimportant connections during training, quan-
tized weights, applied weight sharing and applied Huffman encoding. With these methods,
the size of the weights can be reduced by 30x 50x without losing accuracy.
[29] proposed to compress the weights with image compression method observing the
weights of the fully connected layers can be seen as images. In their work, they used adap-
tive quality factors (high quality factors for important connections and low-quality factors
for unimportant connections with gradients information) when applying image compres-
sion method and showed 40x compression ratio with small accuracy loss.
[30] proposed accelerating CNN by computing convolution operation in frequency do-
main since computationally heavy convolution can be changed simple elementwise multi-
plication in frequency domain. [31] even proposed entire frequency domain computation
for CNN which further improves energy efficiency. Recent work exploited quantization
even with one or two bits enabling further energy efficiency [32, 33, 34]. In some test
cases, binarized network showed comparable results with floating point counterpart since
binarized network acts as regularizer.
Recurrent Neural Networks
A few works have been done for energy efficient inference for RNNs compared to CNNs.
Among them, [22] have shown that limited numerical precision can be applied in RNNs
to reduce computation. To this end, the authors quantized weights and eliminated multi-
plications in the forward pass. This work applied low precision only in the forward pass,
requiring floating point precision for backward propagation
2.1.2 Hardware for Efficient Inference
Feed-Forward Neural Networks
There have been many works utilizing dedicated hardware for efficient CNN inference.
Most of the works exploited reusing the weights to minimize outside memory access and
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used reduced precision to accommodate as many computation units as possible given area.
[35, 36] proposed to use dedicated hardware accelerators using to improve energy ef-
ficiency for CNN inference. [35] utilized roofline model, identified all possible solutions
in the design space, and showed increase in throughput of the CNN. [36] proposed to use
processing engines in a logical 3D rather than 2D topology. The drawback of this scheme
is the routing complexity, but, the authors addressed this issue by reusing data to minimize
routing complexity.
Custom accelerators have been also proposed to further improve the energy efficiency
[37, 38, 39, 40]. [37] used compressed networks as target networks and applied sparse and
weight sharing to reduce memory access by fitting weights in on-chip SRAM. [38] used
multi-chip, embedded DRAM (EDRAM) and router fabric to fit larger models. [39] utilized
row stationary dataflow to reduce memory access showing 1.4x - 2.5x lower energy than
any other dataflows. [40] proposed use of accelerators for both convolutional layer and
fully connected layer and RISC controllers for CNN inference. Authors in [40] utilized
dynamic fixed-point format to efficiently represent weights for different statistics.
Recurrent Neural Networks
For RNNs, [41] used FPGA to accelerate LSTM inference. The authors optimized com-
putation and communication demands for LSTM, and proposed a hardware architecture
for efficient computation and data movement. [42] proposed the way to accelerate com-
pressed LSTM inference on FPGA. First the authors used load balance aware pruning and
dynamic precision data quantization. And they proposed a hardware architecture that can
work directly on the sparse model to efficiently handle irregular computation pattern after
compression.
[21] have introduced a programmable RNN using resistive random access memory
(ReRAM). It showed speed-up of training with less energy by using this new type of mem-
ory. However, authors showed that the device variation of ReRAM can significantly de-
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grade the system performance.
2.1.3 Algorithms for Efficient Training
Deeper models with larger parameters have shown to achieve better accuracy. However,
the drawback of using deeper model is longer training time. For efficient training, [43]
introduced a way, referred as batch normalization, to accelerate training of deep learning
by reducing internal covariate shift. With batch normalization, the mean and variance of
the internal nodes can be modified to be favorable for training. This allows us to have
higher learning rate which enables faster training. Batch normalization also regularizes the
model, thus, reduces need for using other regularization methods like Dropout [44].
[45] proposed a way of training networks, referred as Dense-Sparse-Dense (DSD), in
three steps. It trains networks first with dense parameters, second with sparse parameters
after pruning, and again with dense parameters. Authors showed better accuracy for the
network trained with DSD than that with standard training. The intuition of this work is to
learn important parameters first, and learn the rest of the parameters with already learned
important parameters.
Another approach for efficient training is to use low precision arithmetic which is less
computationally expensive than floating point counterpart. [46] proposed use of limited
precision computation with fixed-point arithmetic and stochastic rounding. [47] has shown
that dynamic-fixed-point arithmetic can help lower precision during training. Given a net-
work and dataset, authors in [46, 47] have performed exhaustive training experiments by
changing precision (total bit-width) and reported minimum usable precision.
2.1.4 Hardware for Efficient Training
Many hardware assisted solutions have been proposed to accelerate training such as dis-
tributed computing [48, 49] and GPU accelerated computing [2].
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2.2 Secure Deep Learning
Deep neural networks and other machine learning classifiers are shown to be vulnerable to
small perturbations to inputs [50, 51, 23, 52, 24]. Those inputs can be indistinguishable to
the human eye, thus, it is possible that the system fails without producing any noticeable
changes.
The adversarial examples can be generated by perturbing the inputs in one step or it-
eratively to either minimize confidence on true labels or increase confidence of a target
false label. Those inputs intended to fool the model M1, are often misclassified on another
model M2. This transferability of the adversarial examples means attacks for the target
network without accessing its exact model can be easily possible with an adversarial exam-
ples generated from another networks. [52, 53] showed this black box attack in a realistic
environment.
Previous works [23, 24, 54] have shown that injecting adversarial examples during
training (adversarial training) increases the robustness of a network against adversarial at-
tacks. The networks trained with ”one-step” method have shown noticeable robustness
against ”one-step” attacks, but, limited robustness against ”iterative” attacks at test time.
Another approach to increase robustness is to use defensive distillation to train network
[55]. Improving robustness of the machine learning against various types of adversarial
attacks remains still challenging and further research is necessary.
2.3 Noise-Robust and Resolution-Invariant Image Classification and Object Detec-
tion
Image classification using deep learning is being widely adopted for the internet of things
(IoTs) [31]. For power hungry edge devices, managing the trade off between power con-
sumption and the quality of the captured images is of great concern. Unprecedented con-
trollability of the camera parameters [56] enables smart control of sensor data generation to
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optimize the information given power budget. For example, region of interest (RoI) based
coding at the sensor [26] can be enabled by controlling spatial resolution of the camera
achieving loss of information with minimized energy consumption. Also, inherent image
sensor noise has to be considered for successful image classification for low-end devices
[27].
Many prior work have been studied the impact of low quality images on the image
classification. Traditional denoising techniques like GSM [57] , KSVD [58] and BM3D
[59] can be used to enhance the quality of the images as a pre-processing. Denoising
auto-encoders [60, 61] have also been proposed. Super resolution [62] can be applied for
low resolution images. Unnecessary process for the clean images due to the use of pre-
processing for every input results in degraded accuracy for the clean images.
Data augmentation approaches [63, 64, 65] can also be used for both noisy images and
low resolution images. Ratio of clean and perturbed images and loss formulation during
training determines performance for each data distribution. The trade off between accuracy
of the clean images and that of the perturbed images has to be considered.
Further study for the noise-robust object detection network is also necessary as there
are not much works related with object detection for noisy and low resolution images.
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CHAPTER 3
DYNAMIC PRECISION TRAINING OF CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL
NETWORKS
3.1 Introduction
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are attractive for many machine learning tasks like
image classification, scene recognition, and natural language processing. The inference
accuracy in CNN improves by adopting deeper network and more data; but at the expense
of longer training time. Many hardware assisted solutions have been proposed to accel-
erate training such as distributed computing [48, 49] and GPU accelerated computing [2].
Dedicated hardware accelerator using FPGA [35] has also been proposed to improve com-
puting throughput. Cong et al. proposed minimizing computation for CNN [66]. Lin et al.
introduced CNN with fewer multiplications [67].
More recently, there is a growing interest in training deep neural network with limited
precision. Gupta et al. proposed limited precision computation with fixed-point arithmetic
and stochastic rounding [46]. Courbariaux et al. has shown that dynamic-fixed-point arith-
metic can help lower precision during training [47].
Given a network and dataset, authors have performed exhaustive training experiments
by changing total bit-width and reported minimum usable precision. However, to enable
low-precision training, it is critical to develop an automated precision search algorithm
instead of an exhaustive precision search as in [46] or [47], and an architecture that can
improve system performance when operating at a lower precision.
This chapter explores hardware-assisted acceleration for training deep neural network
by utilizing low-precision learning. A coupled algorithm and hardware approach that dy-
namically scales precision during training is introduced. The proposed approach utilizes
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a precision-flexible multiply-and-accumulator (MAC) unit for computation. While low-
precision learning has been explored before, the key contributions are:
1. Dynamic precision scaling (DPS) algorithm for training CNN is proposed. The pro-
posed approach utilizes dynamic fixed point and successfully tracks good enough
precision during training for an arbitrary network without exhaustive precision search.
2. A configurable MAC unit that can be configured for various precision (bit width)
computation modes is proposed. The proposed hardware can enable faster computa-
tion by lowering latency for lower precision. A system architecture is presented for
accelerated training using the proposed DPS algorithm and flexible MAC.
Design and synthesis results for the flexible MAC in 28nm CMOS are presented. The
hardware power and performance results are evaluated after the post place and route. Sim-
ulation results show that 3.6x and 5.7x speed-up are achieved using the proposed algorithm
and hardware in benchmark CNNs including Lenet [68] for handwritten digit classification
on the MNIST dataset and Alexnet [2] for image style recognition on the Flickr images,
respectively.
3.2 Proposed Approach: Concept
A fixed-point number is composed of integer part and fractional part and each part has its
own bit width. The bit width for integer part is defined as IL and the bit-width for fractional
part as FL. Fixed point format now can be represented as < IL, FL > and the precision
(total bit width) becomes IL+FL. The smallest positive number ε and the range for < IL,
FL> would be 2-FL and [-2IL-1, 2IL-1 - 2-FL], respectively.
The dynamic fixed-point format [69] allows several decimal points instead of single
global one. With dynamic fixed-point format, the bit utilization can be optimized by min-
imizing IL enough not to overflow. For example, allocating longer bit width may not be
































Figure 3.1: Example bit usage of (a) 8-bit, (b) 6-bit conventional fixed point, (c) 8-bit, and
(d) 6-bit dynamic fixed point. (b) and (d) can be seen as precision (total bit width) scaling
(8-bit→ 6-bit) of (a) and (c) respectively.
parameter statistics in each layer of a CNN are different [70], it is beneficial for each layer
to have its own optimized tuples < IL, FL> for parameters and data.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of precision scaling with conventional fixed point and
dynamic fixed point when used in multiplication (A x B = C). As shown in this figure,
dynamic fixed-point format allows different decimal point for each operand (A, B) and
result (C), thus, can more efficiently utilize bit space. The proposed approach is moti-
vated by the prior works that showed the feasibility of learning with low precision (i.e.
reduce IL+FL) as well as utilization of dynamic fixed-point [7, 8]. During training of
an arbitrary network, the proposed approach dynamically scales the precision (total bit-
width) and allows dynamic fixed-point operation. The proposed approach of dynamically
changing the precision of dynamic fixed point numbers will be referred to as the dynamic
precision scaling (DPS). The minimized bit width by DPS, then, benefits from the proposed
precision-flexible hardware that reduces computing time for lower precision.
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blows up due to 
insufficient precision
Figure 3.2: Train loss for Lenet [68] on MNIST dataset with dynamic fixed point. Blue line
represents initial loss and the red line represents loss after training has done. Each dotted
arrow shows single training trial without changing precision.
The objective is not to find minimum precision for a specific network by exhaustive
precision search, but to speed up training with good enough precision. As shown in Figure
3.2, it is assumed that the minimum precision for a given network and dataset is not known,
and start training with the maximum precision. Then, DPS algorithm tries to find good
enough low precision to speed up training. A precision-flexible hardware platform is also
proposed to achieve this goal. The research focuses on larger network size as capacity of
the model increases with bigger networks which are in need of acceleration of training. For
example, (number of parameters, number of MACs/forward pass) for well-known neural
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Figure 3.3: Fixed-point computation emulation with Caffe framework. Each round layer
performs round-to-nearest operation with data blobs and diff blobs for forward pass and
backward pass respectively.
3.3 Dynamic Precision Scaling
3.3.1 Fixed Point Arithmetic Emulation Setup
In this research, an existing deep learning software framework, Caffe [71] is used to emu-
late limited precision arithmetic. As data and derivatives flow through the network in the
forward and backward passes, Caffe stores the information as blobs. A blob stores two
chunk of memories, data and diff. The former is the data that is passed along, and the latter
is the gradient. Round operation for both data and diff memories is performed to emulate
fixed point arithmetic in a floating point based framework.
Figure 3.3 shows an example fixed-point emulation framework for Lenet. 4- or 2-
length list on the forward/backward pass shows the size of dimensions for each blob. The
size of the first dimension (in this example 64) in the network represents mini batch size for
stochastic gradient decent (SGD) algorithm. And the rest shows size of each dimension of
blob per single batch. 4-length list for learnable parameters in convolutional layers (Conv1,
Conv2) represents number of filters (first dimension) and filter size (24 dimensions). 2-
length list for learnable parameters in inner product layers (Ip1, Ip2) represents output
and input size on forward/backward pass per single batch. Each learnable layer has 1
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dimensional bias term and the value represents output size on forward/backward pass per
single batch.
As shown in this figure, data (data), convolution (Conv1, Co nv2) and inner product
(Ip1, Ip2) layers are followed by round layers (Round1-5). Round operation is only applied
after all computation is done since the proposed MAC temporarily generates 2x larger
precision output. Each round layer performs round-to-nearest operation based on < IL,
FL> for data blobs and diff blobs in forward and backward pass respectively. Max pooling
is used in the pooling layer, thus, it doesnt need following round layer.
Gradient terms (diff blobs in learnable layers) with respect to parameters are rounded
before parameter updates to emulate fixed point arithmetic in the backward pass. And
learnable parameters (data blobs in learnable layers) are rounded after the SGD updates.
3.3.2 Dynamic Precision Scaling Algorithm
This section describes how < IL, FL> for round layers and learnable parameters are
scaled during the training. Overall, the algorithm controls dynamic fixed point format <
IL, FL> for each layer and global precision during training. That means decimal point
is controlled per layer and total bit width globally. The algorithm is activated only after
forward/backward computation has done. The overhead of running this algorithm is very
small since most of the training time is consumed in forward/backward computations in
convolutional layers [72].
DPS algorithm first tries to find minimum ILs for all data paths and learnable param-
eters. Then, it aggressively scales precision to a given target length (tl: initial precision
guess) which applies globally to all blobs in the net. If the moving average keeps de-
creasing, no action is taken. If the training becomes numerically unstable, it increases the
precision to its maximum value (ml). Since the training might become extremely unstable
due to the wrong guess (tl), immediate change to the maximum precision is beneficial.
Once the training loss returns to its last minimum value through the maximum precision
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training, DPS lowers the precision to the unit bit step (s) higher than target length (tl) not
to exceedml−s. In this way, the precision will eventually oscillate betweenml andml−s
alarming sufficient training has been done. From this point, it is up to the users to further
fine-tune with a higher precision. ml, tl and s should be chosen based on the hardwares
supportability or full benefit from the hardware cannot be achieved.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic Precision Scaling Algorithm
Require: P : List of pointers for round layers and learnable parameters, window: Moving
average window for loss, tl: Target bit width, ml: Maximum bit width, s: Unit bit step.
1: initialize(ml)
2: mode← IL SEARCH




7: ma loss.push(computeMaLoss(window, loss))
8: switch mode do
9: case IL SEARCH
10: first overflow ← 0
11: for j in all round layers and learnable parameters
12: first overflow += ilSearch(P [j])
13: if first overflow == size(P ) then
14: mode← FL SEARCH
15: precisionSet(tl)
16: case FL SEARCH
17: if ma loss[0] == max(ma loss[0:window − 1]) then
18: if current precision < ml then
19: last min loss← min(ma loss[0:window − 1])
20: precisionSet(ml)
21: else
22: if ma loss[0] < last min loss then
23: last min loss← 0
24: if tl < ml − s then
25: tl← tl + s
26: precisionSet(tl)
27: until training converged
Details of this heuristic are shown in Algorithm 1. The first step, initialize, initializes
IL and FL with half of the maximum total bit width (ml) for each layer and learnable
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parameter (line 1). ml should be large enough to ensure that the loss does not blow up
and overflow does not occur at an initial stage. The state variables are also initialized
(mode, last min loss) to their initial status (IL SEARCH, 0) (line 23).
At every iteration during training regardless of mode, overFlowCheckRoundLayers
and checkLearnableParams check overflows for all round layers and learnable pa-
rameters and adjust < IL, FL> s. The function calling order is important since the
allowable minimum values of ILs in learnable parameters are limited by the ILs in the
round layers. For example, if the ILs of two consecutive round layers are 3 and 4, IL of
the learnable parameter between those two should be higher or equal to 1. The following
function, computeMaLoss, calculates moving average for loss given window. This value
is appended in ma loss which will be used later.
Next, actions are determined based on the state variable mode (line 8). If the current
mode is initial status (IL SEARCH), IL is decreased by 1 for each round layer and param-
eter at every iteration up to the point where all round layers and learnable parameters have
experienced their first overflows (line 1012). If all round layers and learnable parameters
have found their optimal (minimum) ILs, the mode is changed to FL SEARCH. And total
bit width is set to the target total bit width (tl) for all layers and learnable parameters by
reducing FLs.
When the mode is FL SEARCH, the global precision is scaled based on the training
loss (loss). As training loss is very noisy, moving average loss (ma loss) is utilized in-
stead of raw loss value. If the ma loss keeps decreasing, no action is taken. When the
current moving average loss (ma loss[0]) reaches its maximum value in given window
range (line 17), the precision is immediately changed to its maximum value (ml). By
checking if ma loss reaches its maximum given window, small perturbations in ma loss
are ignored. Once the current moving average loss reaches the last minimum moving av-
erage loss (last min loss) (line 22), the precision is changed again. But this time, the






Figure 3.4: Moving average loss on the left y-axis and total bit-width w/o sign bit on the
right y-axis on MNIST with DPS for (a) (tl:8, ml:32, s:8) and (b) (tl:16, ml:32, s:16).
The precision will eventually oscillate between ml and ml − s.
3.3.3 Dynamic Precision Scaling Results
DPS algorithm is applied to Lenet for MNIST hand-written digit classification and Alexnet
for Flickr style recognition. Output layer size of Alexnet is modified from 1000 to 20
since Flickr style has 20 labels. Fine-tuning is performed using the weights learned from
ImageNet 2012 dataset for Flickr style recognition.
MNIST
This section shows training results with MNIST dataset. SGD algorithm is used for the
parameter updates and the batch size is set to 64. Figure 3.4 shows moving average loss
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and the precision (total bit width) vs iteration plot. Figure 3.4 (a) represents DPS with (tl:8,
ml:32, s:8) and Figure 3.4 (b) shows DPS with (tl:16,ml:32, s:16). For both cases, moving
average window is set to 100. Baseline (training with floating point) result is also shown for
comparison. The proposed DPS algorithm enables low precision training (shaded regions
in the figure) for most of the training time. Shaded regions are the possible durations
for speeding up the training when used with the proposed precision-flexible MAC which
will be discussed later. The precision oscillates at the end of the training with the DPS
algorithm. At that point, the users might consider whether to stop training or continue to
train with high precision.
Training using fixed point format without DPS has also been performed as a compar-
ison. < 8, 8>, < 12, 12> and < 16, 16> format are used for 16-bit, 24-bit and
32-bit fixed point respectively. Learning with 16-bit fixed point does not converge. Learn-
ing with 24-bit fixed point converges, but does not achieve maximum accuracy. Only 32-bit
mode operation shows comparable results with floating point for MNIST data set.
Use of dynamic fixed point enables low precision training (16-bit) compared to conven-
tional fixed point (32-bit) case for Lenet on MNIST. The role of DPS is to help find good
enough precision with single training trial. This is very useful when the cost (time spent)
on single training is very huge.
Flickr Style Recognition
In this section, simulation results on Flickr style images are shown. For this task, fine-
tuning is performed. Training is initialized with the weights based on pre-trained weights
from Alexnet on Imagenet database. 1,600 images are used for training and 400 images for
the test.
Figure 3.5 shows moving training loss and the precision (total bit width) vs iteration
plot. Figure 3.5(a) represents DPS with (tl:16, ml:64, s:16) and Figure 3.5(b) shows DPS






Figure 3.5: Moving average loss on left y-axis and total bit-width w/o sign bit on the right
y-axis on Flickr style images with DPS for (a) (tl:16, ml:64, s:16) and (b) (tl:32, ml:64,
s:32).
(training with floating point) result is also shown for comparison. This case also proves that
the DPS algorithm successfully tracks good enough precision resulting in possible training
speed-up with the proposed flexible MAC.
Training using fixed point format without DPS has also been performed as a compar-
ison. < 16, 16> and < 32, 32> format are used for 32-bit and 64-bit fixed point
respectively. Learning with 32-bit fixed point does not converge. Only 64-bit mode opera-
tion shows comparable results with floating point for Flickr style images.
Dynamic fixed point enables low precision training (32-bit) compared to conventional
fixed point (64-bit) for modified Alexnet on Flickr style images. Compared with Lenet ex-





































































































































































































Figure 3.6: (a) 16-bit Configurable MAC (b) Pipelined 32/16-bit flexible MAC block dia-
gram. Dotted lines represent registers. This MAC unit can perform 16-bit and 32-bit MAC
operation based on mode input.
per forward pass increases.
3.4 Flexible MAC Unit
3.4.1 Configurable MAC unit
Figure 3.6(a) shows a configurable radix-4 Booth-Wallace 16-bit MAC unit. Output p is
calculated with an expression, x*y+c. 2 additional input ports sign x and lsb are used
which differs with the conventional MAC. sign x tells how to treat x for partial product
generation. If sign x is 0, x is treated as an unsigned number and vice-versa. Thus, zero
or msb of x is padded in front of x if sign x is 0 or 1 respectively for partial product
generation. lsb is used for the first radix-4 booth encoding. Normally zero is padded at
the end of y and used for the first encoding, but, lsb is used instead of padding zero.
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3.4.2 Flexible MAC
Figure 3.6(b) shows the proposed pipelined flexible 32-bit MAC with configurable 16-bit
MAC unit as an example. It will be referred to as 32/16-bit flexible MAC for brevity.
FSM controller determines all inputs for configurable 16-bit MAC unit based on mode
(16-bit and 32-bit mode). For proper shift operation, it also generates num shift which
determines how much the partial product should be shifted. Since the critical path exists in
the configurable 16-bit MAC unit, re-timing is performed on the 16-bit MAC. As a result,
parallel prefix adder is placed at the next stage of the 16-bit MAC.
Latency: For conventional MAC, the number of cycles required to get the output is 1.
For the proposed MAC, the number of cycles required for all partial products generation is
1 and 4 cycles for 16-bit and 32 bit operation respectively and the added latency is 2 and 4
for 16-bit and 32 bit mode due to the pipeline. For 32-bit computation mode, the additional
cycles are required in (1) FSM controller unit, (2) shift & sign extension unit, (3) the 64-bit
accumulator unit, and (4) the final mux stage. For 16-bit computation mode, shift & sign
extension unit and 64-bit accumulator can be bypassed as the output can be just calculated
in configurable 16-bit MAC unit. Resulting Latencies of proposed flexible MAC are 1+2
and 4+4 cycles for 16-bit and 32 bit mode.
Throughput: throughput for each mode will be the clock frequency divided by the
latency for general purpose MAC unit. For the proposed precision flexible MAC, effective
throughput is reduced due to the additional latency for each computation mode. However,
the additional latency can be hided as it is pipelined and the partial products should be ac-
cumulated. Generally, the number of partial products summation is large for convolution
operation in CNNs. If the number of partial products summation is large enough, through-
put of the proposed MAC on a systolic array will be the clock frequency divided by 1 and




















































Figure 3.7: (a) Area vs. clock period (b) Area normalized GMACs for maximum precision
mode.
3.4.3 Scalability for the proposed MAC
The proposed MAC is designed and implemented with Synopsys 28nm PDK (supply volt-
age of 1.05V). Design space exploration has been performed for 64-bit, 32-bit traditional
MAC, 64/32-bit and 32/16-bit flexible MAC. Synopsys DesignWare library is used since it
provides area-delay optimized results for traditional MAC unit for fair comparison. Being
too flexible like 32/8-bit or 64/16-bit flexible MAC shows poor results than 32/16-bit or
64/32-bit flexible MAC respectively in terms of area normalized throughput for maximum
precision mode, thus, the results are not reported in this study. Area normalized figure of
merits are valid since the MAC is used in a systolic array where large number of MACs can
be placed closely.
Figure 3.7 shows the implementation results after the place and route. The optimal
design point is chosen based on the results of area normalized Giga MAC operations per
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Table 3.1: 28nm implementation results
64-bit 32-bit 16-bit 64/32-bit MAC 32/16-bit MAC
precision (bit) 64 32 16 64 32 32 16
clock period (ns) 3.8 1.82 1.5 1.08 1.0
area (um2) 48K 22K 6K 33K 10K
GMACS/mm2 5.5 25.1 111 7.0 27.9 24.2 96.8
Systolic ar-
ray (1mm2)
num row 4 8 16 4 10
num col 5 6 10 8 10
Second (GMACS/mm2). Design points which correspond with the red circles in Figure
3.7(b) are chosen for further comparison.
Table 3.1 summarizes the implementation results. 16-bit conventional MAC is also
implemented as a reference. As shown in this table, area of 64/32-bit flexible MAC is
increased by 3.3x compared to 32/16-bit flexible MAC while operating frequency remains
almost the same due to simple re-timing in configuration MAC unit. This results in 3.4x
degradation in area normalized Giga MAC operations per Second (GMACS).
For traditional MAC, area and the clock period of 64-bit MAC are increased by 2.2x and
2.1x compared to 32-bit MAC respectively resulting 4.5x degradation in area normalized
throughput. As a result, 64/32-bit flexible MAC shows better area normalized throughput
(7.0 GMACS/mm2) than traditional 64-bit MAC (5.5 GMACS/mm2) for 64-bit mode. 32-
bit MAC and 32/16-bit flexible MAC shows almost the same results for 32-bit mode. If
the proposed flexible MAC is used for low precision mode with DPS, performance will
increase since the proposed MAC will run at a lower latency. Also the flexible MAC has






















































Figure 3.8: (a) Overall system architecture and (b) flexible MAC engine.
3.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance of the coupled algorithm and hardware approach is pre-
sented.
3.5.1 Systme Architecture
Figure 3.8(a) shows an example overall system architecture and Figure 3.8(b) shows the
proposed hardware IP. Training runs with software on the processor and the hardware IP
offloads the convolution tasks. While training, the software configures the proposed hard-
ware by setting register values and the control engine in IP orchestrates data movement.
Systolic array architecture is adopted since it can utilize the flexible MAC in an area effi-
cient way. General matrix-matrix operation (GEMM) is performed as shown in Figure 3.9.
The number of cycles/GEMM can be obtained by:
#cycles
GEMM
= n× (num row + num col + kernelsize− 2) + added latency (3.1)
,where n is the number of cycles required for all partial products generation in con-














Figure 3.9: (a) Systolic array with MAC (b) 28nm layout of 64/32-bit flexible MAC.
represents the kernel size and added latency is the added latency for the flexible MAC






)× out size (3.2)
, where #batch is the batch size, #kernel is the number of kernels in a convolution
layer, out size is widthheight of the output layer. The utilization of systolic array per single
GEMM operation can be obtained by:
Utilization/GEMM = n× kernelsize÷ ( #cycles
GEMM
) (3.3)
To evaluate the proposed design for deep neural network training, 1 mm2 die area
is assumed for the systolic array. The dimension and the clock period for each systolic
array is shown in the Table 3.1. 32-bit MAC for Lenet and 64-bit MAC for the modified
Alexnet are used as baseline cases. 16-bit and 32-bit MAC for Lenet and the modified
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Table 3.2: GMACS for convolutional layers in Lenet (# batch: 64)
# kernels kernel size
32-bit 16-bit 32/16-bit MAC
baseline w/o DPS (32-bit) w/ DPS (16-bit)
20 25 14.8 12.5 (0.8x) 50.7 (3.4x)
50 500 23.8 21.9 (0.9x) 87.9 (3.7x)
Table 3.3: GMACS for convolutional layers in modified Alexnet (# batch: 64)
# kernels kernel size
64-bit 32-bit 64/32-bit MAC
baseline w/o DPS (64-bit) w/ DPS (32-bit)
96 363 4.9 7.1 (1.4x) 28.6 (5.8x)
256 1200 5.1 7.3 (1.4x) 29.3 (5.7x)
384 2304 5.2 7.3 (1.4x) 29.4 (5.6x)
384 1728 5.2 7.3 (1.4x) 29.4 (5.6x)
256 1728 5.1 7.3 (1.4x) 29.4 (5.7x)
Alexnet are included respectively just for comparison purpose assuming traditional MAC
is tailored for good-enough precision found from the DPS algorithm. This is an ideal case
since tailored conventional MAC cannot offer flexible precision mode. It assumes that the
optimum precision is already known as a priori. For the proposed flexible MAC, 32/16-bit
MAC and 64/32-bit MAC for Lenet and modified Alexnet are used respectively.
3.5.2 Evaluation
Table 3.2 and 3.3 show the performance summary. First, throughput increases as kernel size
increases since it can maximize the utilization of a systolic array. This is due to the fact that
# cycles per GEMM becomes dominated not by size of the systolic array but by kernel size
as kernel size becomes larger. Figure 3.10 shows this trend. Also the utilization of systolic
array for high precision MAC is larger than that for low precision MAC given kernel size.
27
Figure 3.10: Systolic array utilization
The number (num row × numcol) of high precision MACs in given systolic array area is
smaller than that of low precision MACs. Therefore, the utilization of a systolic array with
high precision MAC becomes higher than that with low precision MAC.
Second, combined use of DPS and flexible MAC for the modified Alexnet achieves
better performance than that for Lenet. This is because the flexible MAC is more scalable
as seen in the previous section. It is desirable considering the fact that acceleration of
training is actually needed for larger and deeper neural network where training time is
considerable.
Third, the proposed 64/32-bit flexible MAC with DPS algorithm for the modified Alexnet
can speed up training up to 5.8x compared to baseline 64-bit fixed point MAC. This is
promising result since the most of the training time is spent on convolutional layer [72].
Also, overhead of the proposed algorithm is not huge since it uses already-calculated train
loss and overflow detection which is built-in function in the hardware. One-time check of
overflow registers is sufficient after forward/backward passes per iteration.
Figure 3.11 shows the relative energy per task normalized with high precision MAC
energy (32-bit and 64-bit MAC for Lenet and Alexnet respectively). When the proposed
MAC and DPS are used at the same time, energy per task is reduced by 45% and 69% for
Lenet and modified Alexnet respectively compared to baseline high precision fixed point
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Figure 3.11: Relative energy/task
of the flexible MAC is higher than that of high precision fixed point MAC since the MAC
operates at a higher clock frequency. Note that ‘Lenet DPS 16-bit MAC’ and ‘Alexnet 32-
bit MAC’ cases show ideal results which assume tailored MAC for the final good enough
precision from DPS algorithm. Even though low precision computation of the proposed
flexible MAC consumes more energy than low precision tailored MAC, the benefit of using
precision flexible MAC is huge since it enables actual speeding up of training.
3.6 Summary
This section proposed a coupled algorithm-hardware co-design approach to accelerate train-
ing of deep neural network. An efficient DPS algorithm is proposed to find good enough
precision while maintaining accuracy for convolutional neural network training. A flexi-
ble MAC unit is presented for efficient hardware realization of the proposed algorithm that
provides increased throughput at lower precision. The proposed coupled approach signifi-
cantly reduces training time by up to 5.7x while consuming 31% of MAC energy compared
to conventional fixed-point approach on the modified Alexnet for image style recognition
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on the Flickr style images. As fast training of bigger and deeper network is becoming
increasingly important for deep learning, the proposed approach can provide an efficient
platform for hardware accelerated training.
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CHAPTER 4
LOW PRECISION TRAINING OF RECURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have shown great potentials for various machine learn-
ing tasks such as machine translation [10, 11, 12], speech recognition [13, 14], and even
games [15, 16], with the ability of learning long term dependencies. Long short term mem-
ory (LSTM) [18] and gated recurrent unit (GRU) [19] have enabled such achievements.
Meanwhile, there is a growing interest towards deploying neural networks onto mobile
edge devices for on-chip training and inference with the recent advances in internet-of-
things [73]. However, huge computational demand for their training makes it hard to deploy
neural networks on resource constrained edge devices. Moreover, RNNs are known to
require more computation to train than feed-forward networks due to the vanishing and
exploding gradient problems [20]. Therefore, the most critical goal of designing an on-
chip system for RNN training is to reduce the energy and time required for training.
To address this challenge, various hardware approaches have been proposed for effi-
cient computation of RNN models. For instance, Long et al. [21] have introduced a pro-
grammable RNN using Resistive Random Access Memory (ReRAM). Although it achieves
training speed-up with less energy, the device variation of ReRAM significantly degrades
the system performance. Ott et al. [22] have shown that limited numerical precision can be
applied in RNNs to reduce computation by quantizing weights and eliminating multiplica-
tions in the forward pass. However, this work has applied low precision only in the forward
pass, requiring floating point precision for updating the parameters during backward prop-
agation.

































Figure 4.1: Limited numerical precision training of RNN for forward and backward pass.
backward pass (Figure 4.1. GRU is used as a target RNN and use the dynamic fixed point
format [69] as a candidate numeric format. GRU is used with batch normalization [43] on
input sequences for human activity recognition with the KTH dataset [74]. The simulation
results show that batch normalization improves speed of training with low precision as well
as floating point precision.
Interesting observations found in this chapter include:
1. Batch normalization known to be effective in CNNs is essential even for RNNs training.
2. 64-bit fixed point is not sufficient for training RNNs.
3. The overflow rates, which determine decimal points for dynamic fixed points, should be
carefully controlled to enable successful low precision training.
4. Stochastic rounding achieves superior results than other options.
5. Gradient accumulation for the weights if more important than any other path,
6. Piecewise linear activation together with stochastic rounding works pretty well.
Low precision multiplier and accumulator (MAC) with linear-feedback shift register
(LFSR) is implemented with 28nm Synopsys PDK for energy and performance analysis.
Implementation results show that low precision hardware is 4.7x faster, and energy per task






Figure 4.2: GRU gating [19]
4.2 Gated Recurrent Unit Background
4.2.1 Gated Recurrent Unit
GRU has one hidden state (s) and two gates, a reset gate (r), and an update gate (z) as
shown in Figure 4.2. The current state(st) is combined with the previous state and the
candidate state (h). The update gate determines portion of the previous state (st−1) and the
current candidate state for updating the state. The candidate state is a combination of the
input (x) and the previous state where the reset gate determines how to transfer the previous
state values for the candidate. The output (out) is a function of the current state.
All the gates and the candidate state are calculated based on the previous state, and
the current input and learned parameters are used to calculate the gates and candidate.
Associated equations are given by:
z = σ(xt · U z + st−1 ·W z) (4.1)
r = σ(xt · U r + st−1 ·W r) (4.2)
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h = tanh(xt · Uh + (st−1 ◦ r) ·W h) (4.3)
st = (1− z) ◦ h+ z ◦ st−1 (4.4)
ŷt = softmax(st · V ) (4.5)
where xt is the input vector at time step t, U z, U r, and Uh are the input to hidden weight
matrices, W z, W r, and W h are the hidden to hidden weight matrices, V is the hidden to
output weight matrix, st−1 is the state at t− 1, and ŷt is the estimated output vector at time
t. Here, bias terms for z, r, h and ŷt are omitted for brevity. σ is a sigmoid function and ◦
is element-wise matrix multiplication.
For batch training, xt is an n batch-by-n in matrix, where n batch is the mini batch
size and n in is the size of a single input at time t. U z, U r, and Uh are n in-by-n hidden
matrices, where n hidden is the hidden state size. W z, W r, and W h are n hidden-
by-n hidden matrices, and z, r, h, and st are n batch-by-n hidden matrices. V is an
n hidden-by-n out matrix, where n out is the size of the output, and ŷt is an n batch-by-
n out matrix. Categorical cross entropy is used for loss function which is given by:








where yit is the ground truth at time t.
4.2.2 Backpropagation Through Time
When calculating gradients with respect to weight matrices, unrolled network through time
is used. Figure 4.3 shows all basic equations of BPTT for GRU. Suppose, t = 1, ..., T,
where T is the last time step for a given input. The gradient w.r.t. the last state (∂L/∂sT )
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Input to the next time step





Figure 4.3: BPTT for GRU at single time step t. Intermediate terms (r, z and h) for each
time step are stored during forward pass and used during backward pass for BPTT. Gradient
accumulation is not shown for brevity.
is first calculated, and then fed into the first backward propagation through time. Series of
the gradient terms can be calculated by the chain rule as shown in Figure 4.3.
Once ∂L/∂sT calculation is done, ∂L/∂z and ∂L/∂h can be calculated. ∂L/∂r cannot
be directly calculated since it is not the direct function of st. z0, r0 and h0 are defined to be
the terms before the activation of z, r, and h, respectively.
z0 = xt · U z + st−1 ·W z (4.7)
r0 = xt · U r + st−1 ·W r (4.8)
h0 = xt · Uh + (st−1 ◦ r) ·W h (4.9)











integer part fractional partA x B = C
Figure 4.4: Multiplication examples for (a) conventional fixed point and (b) dynamic fixed
point.
ily calculated. Once ∂L/∂h0 is obtained, ∂L/∂r and ∂L/∂r0 can be obtained. Finally
∂L/∂U z, ∂L/∂U r, ∂L/∂Uh, ∂L/∂W z, ∂L/∂W r, ∂L/∂W h, ∂L/∂st−1, and ∂L/∂x can
be calculated. ∂L/∂st−1 is fed into the next backward time step, and ∂L/∂x is used to
calculate the gradients w.r.t. the batch normalization parameters.
Each term can be calculated with the General matrix-matrix operation (GEMM) or
element-wise multiplication. Multiplier and accumulator (MAC) is a general choice for the
GEMM operation, and it gives higher precision for intermediate products. Thus, apply-
ing quantization right before the assignment for each term is reasonable for low precision
training in RNNs.
∂L/∂U z, ∂L/∂U r, ∂L/∂Uh, ∂L/∂W z, ∂L/∂W r, ∂L/∂W h, and ∂L/∂V calculation
(enclosed with red dotted line in Figure 4.3) are referred to as “backward weight pass” and
the other pass (enclosed with blue dotted line in Figure 4.3) as “backward hidden pass”.
These notations will be used in later section to divide regions for stochastic rounding.
4.3 Low Precision Training Framework
4.3.1 Quantization
Dynamic fixed point [69] is utilized as a target numeric format. As shown in Figure 4.4,
dynamic fixed point allows several decimal points instead of a single global one. Compared
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Figure 4.5: Maximum values for different weight matrices during training.
to feedforward neural networks where the most commonly used nonlinearity activation
function is a rectified linear unit, in RNNs, the state values are bounded by 1 and the gate
values are between 0 and 1 for forward pass since the activation functions (σ and tanh)
limit the values. However, weight matrices and the intermediate terms in the backward
pass in RNNs can have large variances. Figure 4.5 shows maximum values for the weight
matrices for GRU with human activity data set. The statistics are different for the weight
matrices, and gradient terms are not bounded during BPTT. Thus, applying the dynamic
fixed-point format seems to be a natural choice for fixed point arithmetic.
Quantization is performed for every intermediate term for low precision training em-
ulation. For the forward pass, weight matrices U z, U r, Uh,W z,W r,W h, and V are first
quantized as shown in Figure 4.6. QUz , QW z , QUr , QW r , QUh , QWh , and QV are the quan-
tization functions for U z, U r, Uh,W z,W r,W h, and V respectively. Those are distinct
quantization functions making dynamic fixed point format with different decimal point.
Quantization functions for the weight matrices is referred to as “forward weight pass”
quantization.
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Figure 4.6: Two different emulations for weight matrices update.
First option is to quantize the weights at the update phase. In this case, newly computed
values are quantized first, and then the weights are replaced with the new quantized values.
This emulates fully low precision training even for the update process. Second option is
to update weights on the full precision weights and quantize weights only at the forward
pass. This emulates low precision training only for the forward/backward passes, not for
the update process. Since the update process takes very little time compared to the entire
training process, one might use full precision for the update step. These two options will
be studied in later section.
Once the weight matrices are quantized, xt, z, r, h, st, and ŷt are quantized. xt is the
quantized output from batch normalization as follows:
xt = Qx(γ(at −mean(at))/
√
var(at) + β) (4.10)
where at is the original input at time t, and γ and β are the parameters for the batch
normalization. Qx is a quantization function for xt. Likewise, z, r, h, st, and ŷt are also
quantized right before the assignment as follows:
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z = Qs(z0) (4.11)
r = Qs(r0) (4.12)
h = Qs(h0) (4.13)
st = Qs((1− z) ◦ h+ z ◦ st−1) (4.14)
ŷt = Qs(softmax(st · V )) (4.15)
where Qs is a quantization function for {z, r, h, st, ŷt}. z, r, h, st, and ŷt use the same
quantization function since those values are bounded either by [-1, 1] or [0, 1]. Qx and Qs
are also distinct dynamic fixed point functions where each function has different decimal
point. Qx and Qs are referred to as “forward hidden pass” quantization.
Similarly, for the backward pass, each intermediate term and final gradient term in
Figure 4.3 has its own quantization function before assignment.
4.3.2 Rounding Operations
Three different rounding options are considered. The first option is bit truncation. Bit
truncation for signed two’s complement fixed point format is essentially a round down
operation as follows:
Q(x) = bx · 2FLc/2FL
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where FL is the fractional part bit-width. The second option is a round to nearest
operation as follows:
Q(x) = b(x+ ε/2) · 2FLc/2FL
where the smallest positive number ε is 2−FL. The third option is stochastic rounding,
which is computed by:
Q(x) =

bx · 2FLc/2FL, w.p = dx · 2FLe − x · 2FL
b(x+ ε) · 2FLc/2FL, w.p = x · 2FL − bx · 2FLc
In this mode, a rounding operation is performed stochastically based on how close x is
to the quantized values between bx · 2FLc/2FL and b(x+ ε) · 2FLc/2FL.
After quantization, the values are clipped to [−2IL−1, 2IL−1−ε], where IL is the integer
part bit-width. The overflow rate is determined by counting occurrence of clipping over the
total number of quantization.
4.3.3 Decimal Point Search for Dynamic Fixed Point
A dynamic fixed point format is used as a target numerical format. Each quantization
function object has its own < IL, FL> parameter, where IL is integer part bit-width
and FL is fractional part bit-width. The problem is to find the optimal decimal point for
each quantization object during training. A simple algorithm is proposed to determine the
optimal decimal point for each quantization object. Essentially, the algorithm runs on top
of the training process. Once a single forward/backward/update step is done, the decimal
point search function is called.
Details of this heuristic are shown in Algorithm 2. The first step is to initialize dec-
imal point for every quantization object (Q.initialize(tl, f l)) in Q|list based on the
initial total bit-width (tl) and fractional part bit-width (fl). The internal mode variables in
quantization objects are initialized to zero (Q.setMode(0)). Also, global search mode
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Algorithm 2 Decimal Point Search Algorithm
Require: threshold: overflow threshold, Q list: Quantization objects list, tl: Initial total
bit width, fl: Initial fractional part bit width.
1: for Q in Q list
2: Q.initialize(tl, f l)
3: Q.setMode(0)
4: search mode← IL DEC
5: repeat
6: trainOnestep()
7: switch search mode do
8: case IL DEC
9: sum mode← 0
10: for Q in Q list
11: if Q.getOverflow() > threshold then
12: Q.setIL(+1)
13: Q.setMode(1)
14: else if Q.getMode() == 0 then
15: Q.setIL(-1)
16: sum mode+ = Q.getMode()
17: if sum mode == size(Q list) then
18: mode← IL INC
19: case (IL INC)
20: for Q in Q list
21: if Q.getOverflow() > threshold then
22: Q.setIL(+1)
23: until training converged
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is initialized to IL DEC. Once a single training step (trainOnestep()) is done, internal
overflow rate for every quantization object is set as a result of low precision training emula-
tion. If search mode is IL DEC, integer part bit-width is decreased by 1 (Q.setIL(-1)).
This is done if the overflow rate has not exceeded the given threshold since the training is
initiated. As the integer part bit-width continues to decrease, the overflow rate will even-
tually exceed the threshold. If the overflow rate is greater than threshold, the integer
part bit-width is increased by one (Q.setIL(+1)) and set mode to one (Q.setMode(1)).
If every quantization object has ever experienced exceeding of threshold, search mode
is changed to IL INC. In the IN INC mode, only increasing the integer part bit-width is
allowed when the overflow rate is greater than threshold.
4.4 Experimental Results
4.4.1 Simulation Setup
GRU is used for human activity recognition with KTH dataset. The dataset contains 25
persons, 4 scenes and 6 activities (boxing, hand clapping, hand waving, jogging, running,
and walking). The total time step T is 200. Space time interest points (STIP) [17] is utilized
as a local feature extractor, which produces input size (n in) of 168. During training, an
n batch-by-n in matrix (xt) is fed into GRU at time t, and an n batch-by-n out matrix ŷ t
is generated. Even though ŷt is generated at every time t, the last output (ŷT ) is used to
calculate the loss.
In the simulation, n hidden is 40 and n batch is 42. As the total training size is 168
(dataset with 7 persons), one epoch training is equivalent to four iterations.1,000 epochs
are used for training. RMSProp optimizer is used for the update algorithm, and clip the
gradients with 1. BPTT truncation is also used with step 20. The program is implemented
with Theano library in python [75]. 24 bit total bit-width, 0.005 for overflow rate thresh-
old, round to nearest, and fully low precision training is used by default for low precision
training emulation unless otherwise noted.
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Figure 4.7: Loss with and without batch normalization. < bit-width: 24, round to nearest,
overflow rate: 0.005, and fully low precision training>
4.4.2 Batch Normalization
Batch normalization has been introduced first in convolutional neural networks (CNNs).
It allows reducing internal covariance shift during training, thus, makes training faster.
Recent studies showed that batch normalization is effective even in RNNs [76, 77]. Batch
normalization is used for the input sequences in low precision training and compared with
the baseline setting (without batch normalization).
Figure 4.7 shows training exponential moving average loss vs iteration with and with-
out batch normalization on the input sequences for 24 bit dynamic fixed points and floating
points. Exponential moving average loss is used to show the results since the raw loss
data is somewhat noisy due to irregular loss surface. Note that the batch normalization is
beneficial for training with low precision as well as floating point precision. Thus, batch
normalization is always applied for low precision training in the following sections. Note
floating point precision is used for batch normalization parameters (γandβ) since batch
normalization is essential to enable low precision training. Parameters needed for batch
normalization are just two (γ and β) and the batch normalization process takes small por-
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Figure 4.8: Loss with 24-bit, 32-bit and 64-bit dynamic fixed points and floating points. <
round to nearest, overflow rate: 0.005, and fully low precision training>
tion among the entire training process.
4.4.3 Precision
Study of impact of various numerical precisions on low precision training is presented.
Figure 4.8 shows training results for 24-bit, 32-bit, and 64-bit dynamic fixed point, and
floating point as a reference. As shown in this figure, as precision becomes higher, resulting
loss becomes lower. It is interesting to note that for 32-bit dynamic fixed point, sudden
peaks are observed during training even at higher iterations making harder to converge.
Also note that even 64-bit fixed point does not seem to be sufficient for training RNNs,
while 64-bit fixed points is known to be sufficient for training CNNs [78].
4.4.4 Overflow Rate
As discussed in the previous section, the overflow rate threshold is used to determine dec-
imal points for all quantization objects. Figure 4.9 shows several experiments for various
overflow rate thresholds for 24-bit dynamic fixed point. 24-bit precision is used since it is
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Figure 4.9: Loss with overflow rate threshold = 0, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.06. < bit-width: 24,
round to nearest, fully low precision training>
easy to show and differentiate effects coming from various hyper parameters even though
it does not produce floating point-like training.
As shown in Figure 4.9, a high threshold greater than 0.01 leads training unstable. Also,
a threshold value of 0 does not give the optimal point. A threshold around 0.005 gives stable
results and use 0.005 as default threshold for the overflow rate.
4.4.5 Rounding
In this section, various rounding options are studied. Figure 4.10 shows simulation re-
sults for various rounding options including bit truncation, round to nearest, and stochastic
rounding for 24 bit dynamic fixed point format. Bit truncation shows poor results among
the three possible rounding options. Round to nearest results are in the middle between
bit truncation and stochastic rounding. Stochastic rounding shows comparable results with
floating point precision even with 24-bit fixed point precision. It is noteworthy since 64-bit
round to nearest does not produce comparable result with floating point precision.
Regions are divided and stochastic rounding is applied separately. As discussed in
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Figure 4.10: Loss with bit-truncation, round to nearest, stochastic rounding and float-
ing point as a reference. < bit-width: 24, overflow rate: 0.005, and fully low precision
training>
earlier section, “forward hidden”, “forward weight”, “backward hidden”, and “backward
weight” passes are used to divide the region. Figure 4.11 and 4.12 show simulation results
with stochastic rounding in various regions.
In Figure 4.11, stochastic rounding is applied in a single region to understand what is
the most influential pass for stochastic rounding. Applying stochastic rounding on “hidden
passes” (“forward hidden” and “backward hidden”) does not impact much on the training.
Applying stochastic rounding on “weight passes” can have more impact on training than
applying on “hidden passes”. Stochastic rounding can be most effective when applied on
accumulating the gradients (“backward weight”).
In Figure 4.12, stochastic rounding is applied in a group where each group contains two
passes. Stochastic rounding in “forward” or “hidden” does not give any benefit of using
stochastic rounding. Stochastic rounding in “backward” or “weight” gives some benefit
of using stochastic rounding though it does not reach at the level of full stochastic round-
ing. Stochastic rounding needs additional resources when implemented in actual hardware,
thus, one might use stochastic rounding only for accumulating gradients in resource limited
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Figure 4.11: Loss with stochastic rounding in various regions. < bit-width: 24, round to
nearest, overflow rate: 0.005, and fully low precision training >
environments.
4.4.6 Fully Low Precision vs Partial Low Precision Training
In this section, the effect of partial low precision training is studied compared to fully low
precision. Figure 4.13 shows simulation results with fully low precision, forward/backward
low precision with high precision weight update, and forward only low precision. As shown
in this figure, maintaining high precision for updating weight matrices does not help much
for training. It is almost the same with fully low precision training. When applying low pre-
cision only for the forward pass, high precision for backward and update does not improve
training.
4.4.7 Piecewise Linear Activation
Since sigmoid and tanh functions have to compute exponential function, one might consider
applying a piecewise linear activation function to reduce computation. The hard sigmoid
and ultra fast sigmoid functions are used in Theano library. Essentially hard sigmoid is
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Figure 4.12: Loss with stochastic rounding in various regions. < bit-width: 24, overflow
rate: 0.005, and fully low precision training>
three-part linear approximation and ultra fast sigmoid is five-part linear approximation.
Piecewise linear function for tanh is defined as:
piecewise tanh(x) = 2 · piecewise σ(2x)− 1
where piecewise σ can be either the hard sigmoid or ultra fast sigmoid function. Piece-
wise linear activations are only used for forward pass. During the backward pass, the gra-
dients obtained from non-piecewise linear function are used instead of using the actual
gradient since the gradient for hard sigmoid is 0.2 between -2.5 and 2.5, and 0 elsewhere.
If the value falls outside the region [-2.5, 2.5], weight matrices will not be updated.
Figure 4.14 shows simulation results with piecewise linear activation functions. As
shown in this figure, all the sigmoid approximation functions show similar results with the
actual sigmoid function. This suggests that combining the use of piecewise approximation
in the forward path and non-piecewise version of gradients in the backword path can reduce
computation.
Since stochastic rounding showed comparable results with floating point, stochastic
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Figure 4.13: Loss with fully low precision, forward/backward low precision, forward only
low precision and floating point as a reference. < bit-width: 24, round to nearest, overflow
rate: 0.005>
rounding is also applied together with piecewise linear activation function. Figure 4.15
shows simulation results. Together with stochastic rounding, ultra fast sigmoid shows sim-
ilar results with actual sigmoid. Also, hard sigmoid shows almost similar results with sig-
moid. One can implement effective low precision training with piecewise linear activation
function when used with stochastic rounding.
4.5 Hardware Implementation
Based on the simulation results, 24-bit fixed point with stochastic rounding shows compara-
ble results with floating point precision. Therefore, low precision hardware is implemented
and compared with floating point MAC for energy and performance analysis. Figure 4.16
shows the proposed hardware block diagram. Adding uniform random number between 0
and the smallest positive number (2−FL3) is realized with LFSR filter and mask function.
mask bits are thermometer code indicating cropping point (0 to 1 transition on mask bits).
Cropping point is determined by adding two FLs of the inputs and subtracting FL of the
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Figure 4.14: Loss with hard sigmoid, ultra fast sigmoid and sigmoid. < bit-width: 24,
round to nearest, overflow rate: 0.005, and fully low precision training>
Table 4.1: MAC Unit Implementation Summary
24-bit fixed point w/ stochastic rounding 32-bit floating point
Area (um2) 13,299 24,125
Clock (ns) 1.6 4
Power (mW ) 4.01 2.623
output. The final output is cropped with 24-bit at the cropping point.
The proposed 24-bit dynamic fixed point MAC with a stochastic rounding unit is im-
plemented with Synopsys 28nm PDK. 32-bit floating point MAC is also implemented for
comparison. Table 4.1 summarizes implementation results. The proposed hardware has
small foot print and runs at a higher frequency than 32-bit floating point MAC. The pro-
posed hardware is implemented on systolic array [79, 78] to analyze entire system per-
formance. Fig. 17 shows implementation results. The proposed hardware is smaller than
32-bit floating point MAC, thus, number of MAC units integrated in the systolic array is
larger than the systolic array with 32-bit floating point MAC unit.
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Figure 4.15: Loss with hard sigmoid, ultra fast sigmoid and sigmoid. < bit-width: 24,
stochastic rounding, overflow rate: 0.005, and fully low precision training>
As a result, the total one mini-batch training time of the proposed hardware is 4.7x
faster than that of 32-bit floating point hardware. Also, the proposed hardware requires
3.09x lower energy than 32-bit floating point hardware.
Since stochastic rounding operation is not needed most of the time (it takes only 2.2%
of the entire operations), clock gating can be applied for stochastic rounding to reduce
unnecessary toggling. Dynamic power consumption for the stochastic rounding unit is
1.36mW (34% of the entire power consumption), thus, resulting energy becomes 4.55x
lower than that of floating point MAC array.
4.6 Summary
This section studies low precision training of RNNs, especially for recently proposed GRU.
Dynamic fixed point format is used as a target numeric format and explore low precision
training extensively. Manual BPTT calculation for GRU is implemented to emulate low
precision training. The study shows batch normalization is essential to enable success-















row size 8 6
column size 8 6
# cycles/forward 24K 44K
# cycles/backward 52K 100K
1 step mini-batch training time (ms) 24.3 (4.7x faster) 114.7
Energy/step (mJ)
w/o clock gating 97.4 (3.09x efficient)
301
w/ clock gating for rounding 66.2 (4.55x efficient)
(b)
Figure 4.16: (a) 28nm implementation layout of systolic array of 24-bit MAC with stochas-
tic rounding, and (b) comparison with 32-bit floating point counterpart.
train RNNs, and the overflow rate threshold that determines decimal point search has to
be kept small. Stochastic rounding with 24-bit precision shows comparable results with
floating point precision. Applying stochastic rounding in gradients accumulation during
the backward pass is more effective than the any other passes. Piecewise linear activation
gives almost similar results with actual nonlinear function which enables further speed-up
by removing exponential terms. Systolic array of 24-bit dynamic fixed point MAC with
stochastic rounding unit is implemented with Synopsys 28nm PDK for energy and perfor-
mance analysis. Implementation results show the proposed hardware achieves 4.7x faster





Deep neural networks and other machine learning classifiers are shown to be vulnerable
to small perturbations to inputs [50, 51, 23, 52, 24]. Previous works [23, 24, 25] have
shown that injecting adversarial examples during training (adversarial training) increases
the robustness of a network against adversarial attacks. The adversarial examples can be
generated by perturbing the inputs in one step or iteratively to either minimize confidence
on true labels or increase confidence of a target false label (section 5.2.1). The networks
trained with one-step methods have shown noticeable robustness against one-step attacks,
but, limited robustness against iterative attacks at test time. In [24], authors explained that
using iterative methods for training didn’t help improve robustness against iterative attacks
at test time. To address this challenge, The research has made the following contributions:
Cascade adversarial training: The research first shows that iteratively generated ad-
versarial images transfer well between networks when the source and the target networks
are trained with the same training method. Inspired by this observation, the research pro-
poses cascade adversarial training which transfers the knowledge of the end results of
adversarial training. In particular, the proposed approach trains a network by injecting
iter FGSM images (section 5.2.1) crafted from an already defended network (a network
trained with adversarial training) in addition to the one-step adversarial images crafted
from the network being trained. The concept of using already trained networks for adver-
sarial training is also introduced in [80]. In their work, purely trained networks are used
as another source networks to generate one-step adversarial examples for training. On the
contrary, the cascade adversarial training uses already defended network for iter FGSM
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images generation.
Low level similarity learning: The study advances the previous data augmentation
approach [24] by adding additional regularization in deep features to encourage a network
to be insensitive to adversarial perturbation. In particular, the proposed approach injects
adversarial images in the mini batch without replacing their corresponding clean images
and penalize distance between embeddings from the clean and the adversarial examples.
There are past examples of using embedding space for learning similarity of high level
features like face similarity between two different images [81, 82, 83]. Instead, the embed-
ding space is used for learning similarity of the pixel level differences between two similar
images. The intuition of using this regularization is that small difference on input should
not drastically change the high level feature representation.
Analysis of adversarial training: To show the effectiveness of the algorithms, ResNet
models [3] are used on MNIST [84] and CIFAR10 dataset [85] using the proposed ad-
versarial training. The study first shows low level similarity learning improves robust-
ness of the network against adversarial images generated by one-step and iterative meth-
ods compared to the prior work. Modifying the weight of the distance measure in the
loss function can help control trade-off between accuracies for the clean and adversar-
ial examples. Together with cascade adversarial training and low-level similarity learn-
ing, accuracy increase against unknown iterative attacks is achieved, but at the expense
of decreased accuracy for one-step attacks. Finally, the study also shows the proposed
cascade adversarial training and low level similarity learning provide much better ro-
bustness against black box attack. Code to reproduce the experiments is available at
https://github.com/taesikna/cascade_adv_training.
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5.2 Background on Adversarial Attacks
5.2.1 Attack Methods
One-step fast gradient sign method (FGSM), referred to as “step FGSM”, generates
adversarial imageXadv by adding sign of the gradients w.r.t. the clean imageX multiplied
by ε ∈ [0, 255] as shown below [23]:
Xadv =X + ε sign(∇XJ(X, ytrue))
One-step target class method generates Xadv by subtracting sign of the gradients
computed on a target false label as follows:
Xadv =X − ε sign(∇XJ(X, ytarget))
Least likely class yLL is used as a target class and refer this method as “step ll”.










α = 1, number of iterations N to be min(ε + 4, 1.25ε) is used in this study. ClipX,ε
is elementwise clipping function where the input is clipped to the range [max(0, X −
ε),min(255, X + ε)].
Iterative least-likely class method, referred to as “iter ll”, is to apply “step ll” with










Table 5.1: CIFAR10 test results (%) under black box attacks for ε=16. Source networks
share the same initialization which is different from the target networks. {Target: R20,
R20K : standard,Kurakin’s, Source: R202, R20K2: standard,Kurakin’s.}
Target
Source: step FGSM Source: iter FGSM
R202 R20K2 R202 R20K2
R20 16.2 31.6 2.7 60.1
R20K 66.7 82.7 55.8 28.5
Carlini and Wagner attack [86] referred to as “CW” solves an optimization problem
which minimizes both an objective function f (such that attack is success if and only if
f(Xadv) < 0) and a distance measure betweenXadv andX .
Black box attack is performed by testing accuracy on a target network with the ad-
versarial images crafted from a source network different from the target network. Lower
accuracy means successful black-box attack. This attack is referred to as white-box attack.
5.2.2 Defense Methods
Adversarial training [24]: is a form of data augmentation where it injects adversarial
examples during training. In this method, k examples are taken from the mini batch B
(size of m) and the adversarial examples are generated with one of step method. The k
adversarial examples replaces the corresponding clean examples when making mini batch.
Below this adversarial training method is referred to as “Kurakin’s”.
Ensemble adversarial training [80]: is essentially the same with the adversarial train-
ing, but uses several pre-trained vanilla networks to generate one-step adversarial examples
for training. Below this adversarial training method referred to as “Ensemble”.
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Figure 5.1: Correlation between adversarial noises from different networks for each ε.
Shaded region shows ± 0.1 standard deviation of each line.
5.3 Proposed Approach
5.3.1 Transferability Analysis
In this section, transferability between purely trained networks and adversarially trained
networks is shown under black box attack. ResNet [3] models are used for CIFAR10 clas-
sification. 20-layer ResNets are trained with different methods (standard training, adver-
sarial training [24]) and those are used as target networks. Networks (standard training and
adversarial training) are retrained with the different initialization from the target networks,
and the trained networks are used as source networks. Experimental details can be found
in Section 5.4. In Table 5.1, test accuracies under black box attack are reported.
Transferability (step attack): First, high robustness against one-step attack between
defended networks (R20K2 -> R20K) and low robustness between undefended networks
(R202 -> R20) are observed. This observation shows that error surfaces of neural networks
are driven by the training method and networks trained with the same method end up similar
optimum states.
It is noteworthy to observe that the accuracies against step attack from the undefended
network (R202) are always lower than those from defended network (R20K2). Possible
explanation for this would be that adversarial training tweaks gradient seen from the clean
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image to point toward weaker adversarial point along that gradient direction. As a result,
one-step adversarial images from defended networks become weaker than those from un-
defended network.
Transferability (iterative attack): “iter FGSM” attack remains very strong even under
the black box attack scenario but only between undefended networks or defended networks.
This is because iter FGSM noises (Xadv-X) from defended networks resemble each other.
As shown in Figure 5.1, higher correlation between iter FGSM noises from a defended
network (R20K) and those from another defended network (R20K2) is observed.
Difficulty of defense/attack under the black box attack scenario: As seen from this
observation, it is efficient to attack an undefended/defended network with iter FGSM ex-
amples crafted from another undefended/defended network. Thus, when building a robust
network under the black box attack scenario, it is desired to check accuracies for the adver-
sarial examples crafted from other networks trained with the same strategy.
5.3.2 Cascade Adversarial Training
Inspired by the observation that iter FGSM images transfer well between defended net-
works, cascade adversarial training is proposed. The algorithm trains a network by inject-
ing iter FGSM images crafted from an already defended network. The hypothesis is that
the network being trained with cascade adversarial training will learn to avoid such adver-
sarial perturbation, enhancing robustness against iter FGSM attack. The intuition behind
this proposed method is that cascade adversarial training transfers the knowledge of the end
results of adversarial training. In particular, it trains a network by injecting iter FGSM im-
ages crafted from already defended network in addition to the one-step adversarial images
crafted from the network being trained.
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Figure 5.2: Cascade adversarial training regularized with a unified embedding.
5.3.3 Regularization with a Unified Embedding
The algorithm proposed in [24] is advanced by adding low level similarity learning. Unlike
[24], the clean examples used for generating adversarial images are also included in the
mini batch. Once one step forward pass is performed with the mini batch, embeddings are
followed by the softmax layer for the cross entropy loss for the standard classification. At
the same time, clean embeddings and adversarial embeddings are taken, and the distance
between the two is minimized with the distance based loss.
The distance based loss encourages two similar images (clean and adversarial) to pro-
duce the same outputs, not necessarily the true labels. Thus, low-level similarity learning
can be considered as an unsupervised learning. By adding regularization in higher embed-
ding layer, convolution filters gradually learn how to ignore such pixel-level perturbation.







[bidirectional loss] [pivot loss]Pivots
Figure 5.3: (Left) Bidirectional loss. (Right) Pivot loss.
perturbation can be ignored in lower hierarchy of networks. However, adding regularization
term on higher embedding layer right before the softmax layer showed best performance.
The more convolutional filters have chance to learn such similarity, the better the perfor-
mance. Note that cross entropy doesn’t encourage two similar images to produce the same
output labels. Standard image classification using cross entropy compares ground truth
labels with outputs of a network regardless of how similar training images are.
The entire training process combining cascade adversarial training and low level simi-
larity learning is shown in Figure 5.2. The total loss is defined as follows:
Loss =
1















Ei and Eadvi are the resulting embeddings from Xi and X
adv
i , respectively. m is the
size of the mini batch, k (≤ m/2) is the number of adversarial images in the mini batch. λ
is the parameter to control the relative weight of classification loss for adversarial images.
λ2 is the parameter to control the relative weight of the distance based loss Ldist in the total
loss.
Bidirectional loss minimizes the distance between the two embeddings by moving both
clean and adversarial embeddings as shown in the left side of the Figure 5.3.
Ldist(E
adv
i ,Ei) = ||Eadvi −Ei||NN , N ∈ 1, 2 i = 1, 2, ..., k
N = 1 and 2 were tried and there was not much difference between the two. The results
with N = 2 are reported for the rest of the chapter otherwise noted. When N = 2, Ldist
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becomes L2 loss.
Pivot loss minimizes the distance between the two embeddings by moving only the
adversarial embeddings as shown in the right side of the Figure 5.3.
Ldist(E
adv
i |Ei) = ||Eadvi −Ei||NN , N ∈ 1, 2 i = 1, 2, ..., k
In this case, clean embeddings ( Ei ) serve as pivots to the adversarial embeddings.
1 In particular, back-propagation through the clean embeddings is not performed for the
distance based loss. The intuition behind the use of pivot loss is that the embedding from a
clean image can be treated as the ground truth embedding.
5.4 Experimental Setup
This section describes experimental setup. The image values are scaled down to [0,1] and
no data augmentation is performed for MNIST. For CIFAR10, the image values are scaled
down to [0,1] and subtracted by per-pixel mean values. 24x24 random crop and random flip
are performed on 32x32 original images. 2 Adversarial images are generated with “step ll”
after these steps unless otherwise noted.
For adversarial training, k = 64 adversarial examples are generated among 128 images
in one mini-batch. As in [24], randomly chosen ε is used in the interval [0, max e] with
clipped normal distribution N(µ = 0, σ = max e/2), where max e is the maximum ε
used in training. max e = 0.3*255 is used for MNIST, and 16 for CIFAR10. λ = 0.3 and
λ2 = 0.0001 are used in the loss function.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimizer is used with momentum of 0.9. Weight
decay is 0.0001. Training is started with a learning rate of 0.1. The learning rate is then
divided by 10 at 4k and 6k iterations for MNIST, and 48k and 72k iterations for CIFAR10.
1In Tensorflow, non-trainable variable is created and this is updated with the clean embedding Ei at every
training step.
2Original paper [3] performed 32x32 random crop on zero-padded 40x40 images.
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Table 5.2: MNIST test results (%) for 20-layer ResNet models (ε = 0.3*255 at test time). {
R20M: standard training, R20MK : Kurakin’s adversarial training, R20MB: Bidirectional
loss, R20MP : P ivot loss.} CW L∞ attack is performed with 100 test samples (10 samples
per each class) and the number of adversarial examples with ε > 0.3*255 is reported.
Additional details for CW attack can be found in Appendix A.3
Model clean step ll step FGSM iter ll iter FGSM CW
R20M 99.6 9.7 10.3 0.0 0.0 0
R20MK 99.6 96.7 94.5 89.0 60.2 46
R20MB (Proposed) 99.5 97.3 96.2 97.2 88.5 81
R20MP (Proposed) 99.5 97.1 95.7 96.9 88.9 82
Training is terminated at 8k iterations for MNIST, and 94k iterations for CIFAR10. 3
Initialization affects the training results slightly as in [24], thus, the pre-trained net-
works are used as initial starting points for different configurations. Pre-training is done
with 2 and 10 epochs for MNIST and CIFAR10.
5.5 Low Level Similarity Learning Analysis
5.5.1 Experimental Results on MNIST
In this section, the effect of low level similarity learning is first analyzed on MNIST. ResNet
models [3] are trained with different methods (standard training, Kurakin’s adversarial
training and adversarial training with the distance based loss). Experimental details can
be found in Section 5.4.
Table 5.2 shows the accuracy results for MNIST test dataset for different types of at-
tack methods. As shown in the table, the proposed method achieves better accuracy than
Kurakin’s method for all types of attacks with a little sacrifice on the accuracy for the clean
images. Even though adversarial training is done only with “step ll”, additional regulariza-
tion increases robustness against unknown “step FGSM”, “iter ll”, “iter FGSM” and CW
L∞ attacks. This shows that the low-level similarity learning can successfully regularize
3The adversarial training requires longer training time than the standard training. Authors in the original
paper [3] changed the learning rate at 32k and 48k iterations and terminated training at 64k iterations.
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the one-step adversarial perturbation and its vicinity for simple image classification like
MNIST.
5.5.2 Embedding Space Visualization
To visualize the embedding space, 20-layer ResNet model is modified. The last fully con-
nected layer (64x10) is changed to two fully connected layers (64x2 and 2x10). Networks
are re-trained with standard training, Kurakin’s method and with the pivot loss on MNIST.
4
In Figure 5.4, embeddings (dimension=2) between two fully connected layers are drawn.
As seen from this figure, adversarial images from the network trained with standard training
cross the decision boundary easily as ε increases. With Kurakin’s adversarial training, the
distances between clean and adversarial embeddings are minimized compared to standard
training. And the pivot loss further minimizes distance between the clean and adversarial
embeddings. Note that the pivot loss also decreases absolute value of the embeddings, thus,
higher λ2 will eventually result in overlap between distinct embedding distributions. Intra
class variation of the clean embeddings is also minimized for the network trained with the
pivot loss as shown in the scatter plot in Figure 5.4 (c).
4Modified ResNet models showed slight decreased accuracy for both clean and adversarial images com-
pared to original ResNet counterparts, however, similar trend is observed (improved accuracy for iterative
attacks for the network trained with pivot loss) as in Table 5.2.
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(c) P ivot (Proposed)
Figure 5.4: Embedding space visualization for modified ResNet models trained on MNIST.
x-axis and y-axis show first and second dimension of embeddings respectively. Scatter plot
shows first 100 clean embeddings per each class on MNIST test set. Each arrow shows
difference between two embeddings (one from iter FGSM image (ε) and the other from
(ε+8)). Arrows are drawn from ε = 0 to ε = 76 (≈ 0.3*255) for one sample image per each
class. As shown in this figure, differences between clean and corresponding adversarial
embeddings are minimized for the network trained with pivot loss.
5.5.3 Experimental Results on CIFAR10
Table 5.3 shows the accuracy results for 20-layer ResNet models on CIFAR10 test dataset.
Again, the proposed low-level similarity learning further improves robustness against all
types of attacks compared to Kurakin’s adversarial training. However, the accuracy im-
provements against iterative attacks (iter FGSM, CW) are limited, showing regularization
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Table 5.3: CIFAR10 test results (%) for 20-layer ResNet models. { R20: standard training,
R20K : Kurakin’s adversarial training, R20B: Bidirectional loss, R20P : P ivot loss.} CW
L∞ attack is performed with 100 test samples (10 samples per each class) and the number
of adversarial examples with ε > 2 or 4 is reported.
Model clean
step ll step FGSM iter FGSM CW
ε=2 ε=16 ε=2 ε=16 ε=2 ε=4 ε=2 ε=4
R20 90.9 44.5 11.5 28.7 12.2 14.0 0.4 8 0
R20K 91.0 85.8 84.4 78.9 81.5 50.6 9.8 13 2
R20B (Proposed) 91.0 86.1 87.3 78.7 90.0 52.0 11.2 19 3
R20P (Proposed) 90.9 86.2 88.3 79.7 91.7 52.0 11.3 18 4
effect of low-level similarity learning is not sufficient for the iterative attacks on complex
color images like CIFAR10.
5.5.4 Alternative Visualization on Embeddings
In this section, average value of the argument to the softmax layer is drawn for the true
class and the false classes to visualize how the adversarial training works as in Figure 5.5.
Standard training, as expected, shows dramatic drop in the values for the true class as ε is
increased in “step ll” or “step FGSM direction. With adversarial training, the value drop is
limited at small ε and the proposed method even increases the value in certain range upto
ε=10. Note that adversarial training is not the same as the gradient masking. As illustrated
in Figure 5.5, it exposes gradient information, however, quickly distort gradients along the
sign of the gradient (“step ll” or “step FGSM) direction.
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(a) R20, step ll



















(b) R20K , step ll



















(c) R20P , step ll





















(d) R20, step FGSM



















(e) R20K , step FGSM



















(f) R20P , step FGSM





















(g) R20, random sign



















(h) R20K , random sign



















(i) R20P , random sign
Figure 5.5: Argument to the softmax vs. ε in test time. “step ll”, “step FGSM” and ”ran-
dom sign” methods were used to generate test-time adversarial images. Arguments to the
softmax were measured by changing ε for each test method and averaged over randomly
chosen 128 images from CIFAR10 test-set. Blue line represents true class and the red line
represents mean of the false classes. Shaded region shows ± 1 standard deviation of each
line.
Improved results (broader margins than baseline) are observed for “random sign” added
images even though the random sign added images are not used during training. Overall
shape of the argument to the softmax layer in the proposed case becomes smoother than
Kurakin’s method, suggesting the proposed method is good for pixel level regularization.
Even though actual value of the embeddings for the true class in R20P is smaller than that
in R20K , the standard deviation of R20P is less than R20P , making better margin between
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Figure 5.6: Accuracy vs. λ2
the true class and false classes.
5.5.5 Effect of λ2 on CIFAR10
In this section, 20-layer ResNet models are trained with various λ2s for CIFAR10 dataset
to study effects of the weight of the distance measure in the loss function. Figure 5.6 shows
that a higher λ2 increases accuracy of the iteratively generated adversarial images. How-
ever, it reduces accuracy on the clean images, and increasing λ2 above 0.3 even results in
divergence of the training. This is because embedding distributions of different classes will
eventually overlap since absolute value of the embedding will be decreased as λ2 increases
as seen from the section 5.5.2. This experiment results show that there exists clear trade-
off between accuracy for the clean images and that for the adversarial images. Thus, it is
recommend using a very high λ2 only under strong adversarial environment.
5.6 Label Leaking Analysis
Accuracies for the “step FGSM” adversarial images become higher than those for the clean
images (“label leaking” phenomenon) by training with “step FGSM” examples as in [24].
Interestingly, “label leaking” phenomenon is also observed even without providing true la-
bels for adversarial images generation. “Label leaking” is a natural result of the adversarial
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(b) R20K : Kurakin’s



















(c) R20P : Pivot (Proposed)
Figure 5.7: Averaged Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the gradients w.r.t. two
images. Correlation were measured by changing ε for each adversarial image and averaged
over randomly chosen 128 images from CIFAR10 test-set. Shaded region represents ± 0.5
standard deviation of each line.
training.
To understand the nature of adversarial training, correlation between gradients w.r.t.
different images (i.e. clean vs. adversarial) is measured as a measure of error surface
similarity. In particular, correlation is measured between gradients w.r.t. (1) clean vs.
“step ll” image, (2) clean vs. “step FGSM” image, (3) clean vs. “random sign” added
image, and (4) “step ll” image vs. “step FGSM” image for three trained networks (a)
R20, (b) R20K and (c) R20P (Proposed) in Table 5.3. Figure 5.7 draws average value of
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correlations for each case.
Meaning of the correlation: In order to make strong adversarial images with “step FGSM”
method, correlation between the gradient w.r.t. the clean image and the gradient w.r.t. its
corresponding adversarial image should remain high since the “step FGSM” method only
use the gradient w.r.t. the clean image (ε=0). Lower correlation means perturbing the adver-
sarial image at ε further to the gradient (seen from the clean image) direction is no longer
efficient.
Results of adversarial training: (1) and (2) become quickly lower than (3) as ε in-
creases. This means that, when the inputs are provided toward the steepest (gradient) di-
rection on the error surface, gradient is more quickly uncorrelated with the gradient w.r.t.
the clean image than when the inputs are provided along the random direction. As a result
of adversarial training, this uncorrelation is observed at a lower ε making one-step attack
less efficient even with small perturbation. (1), (2) and (3) for R20P are slightly lower than
Kurakin’s method at the same ε which means that the proposed similarity learning is better
at defending one-step attacks than Kurakin’s.
Error surface similarity between “step ll” and “step FGSM” images: (4) remains
high with higher ε for all trained networks. This means that the error surface (gradient) of
the “step ll” image and that of its corresponding “step FGSM” image resemble each other.
That is the reason why the robustness against “step FGSM” method is observed only by
training with “step ll” method and vice versa. (4) for R20P is slightly higher than R20K
at the same ε and that means the similarity learning tends to make error surfaces of the
adversarial images with “step ll” and “step FGSM” method to be more similar.
Analysis of label leaking phenomenon: Interestingly, (2) becomes slightly negative in
certain range (1 < ε < 3 for Kurakin’s, and 1 < ε < 4 for Pivot (Proposed) ) and this could
be the possible reason for “label leaking” phenomenon. For example, let’s assume that
there is a perturbed image (by “step FGSM” method) at ε where the correlation between
the gradients w.r.t. that image and the corresponding clean image is negative. Further
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Table 5.4: CIFAR10 test results (%) for 20 trained networks (Kurakin’s and the proposed
method w/ pivot loss).
step ll attack iter ll attack
ε 0 4 16 4 16
mean ±
std
Kurakin’s 90.9 ± 0.25 86.1 ± 0.98 84.6 ± 2.89 64.2 ± 2.89 16.3 ± 2.02
Pivot 90.9 ± 0.25 87.3 ± 0.79 87.8 ± 0.82 69.4 ± 1.61 21.9 ± 1.85
increase of ε with the gradient (w.r.t. the clean image) direction actually decreases the
loss resulting in increased accuracy (label leaking phenomenon). Due to the error surface
similarity between “step ll” and “step FGSM” images and this negative correlation effect,
however, label leaking phenomenon can always happen for the networks trained with one-
step adversarial examples.
5.6.1 Effect of Variations in Initial Condition
To see how the training is sensitive to the initialization, 20 networks are trained 5 with
Kurakin’s method and the proposed method with pivot loss (”step ll”). Mean accuracy and
the standard deviation are reported.
As shown in Table 5.4, the proposed method produces higher mean accuracies and
lower standard deviation of accuracy than Kurakin’s method. This suggests that the low-
level similarity learning also reduces uncertainties in training, thus, makes networks to be
converged similarly. Interestingly, networks robust to one-step attacks tend to be less robust
to iterative attacks and vice versa for both methods, however, this variation was less in the
proposed case than in Kurakin’s case. Difficulty of optimizing networks for both one-step
attacks and iterative attacks can also be found in the following section.
5Adversarial training without distance based loss sometimes ended up with poor results. Thus, a learn-
ing rate was scheduled at 60k and 90k iterations, and the training is terminated at 120k iterations for this
experiment.
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(a) Corr: same initialization













diff init, (R20K, R20K2)
diff init, (R20K, R56K)
diff init, (R20K, R110K)
diff init, (R56K, R56K2)
diff init, (R110K, R110K2)
(b) Corr: different initialization
Figure 5.8: Correlation between iter FGSM noises crafted from different networks for each
ε. Correlation is averaged over randomly chosen 128 images from CIFAR10 test-set.
5.7 Cascade Adversarial Training Analysis
5.7.1 Source Network Selection
In this section, the transferability of iter FGSM images between various architectures is
provided. To this end, 56-layer ResNet networks (Kurakin’s, pivot loss) are trained with
the same initialization. Then another 56-layer ResNet network (Kurakin’s) are trained with
different initialization. Training for the 110-layer ResNet networks are repeated. Correla-
tion between iter FGSM noises are measured from different networks.
Figure 5.8 (a) shows correlation between iter FGSM noises crafted from Kurakin’s net-
work and those from Pivot network with the same initialization. Conjectured from [24],
high correlation between iter FGSM noises is observed from networks with the same ini-
tialization. Correlation between iter FGSM noises from the networks with different ini-
tialization, however, becomes lower as the network is deeper as shown in Figure 5.8 (b).
Since the degree of freedom increases as the network size increases, adversarially trained
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Table 5.5: CIFAR10 test results (%) for 110-layer ResNet models. CW L∞ attack is per-
formed with 100 test samples (10 samples per each class) and the number of adversarial
examples with ε > 2 or 4 is reported. {R110K : Kurakin’s, R110P : P ivot loss, R110E:
Ensemble training, R110K,C : Kurakin’s and Cascade training, R110P,E: P ivot loss and
Ensemble training, and R110P,C : P ivot loss and Cascade training}
Model clean
step ll step FGSM iter FGSM CW
ε=2 ε=16 ε=2 ε=16 ε=2 ε=4 ε=2 ε=4
R110K 92.3 88.3 90.7 86.0 95.2 59.4 9.2 25 4
R110P (Proposed) 92.3 86.0 89.4 81.6 91.6 64.1 20.9 32 7
R110E 92.3 86.3 74.3 84.1 72.9 63.5 21.1 24 6
R110K,C (Proposed) 92.3 86.2 72.8 82.6 66.7 69.3 33.4 20 5
R110P,E (Proposed) 91.3 84.0 65.7 77.6 54.5 66.8 38.3 38 16
R110P,C (Proposed) 91.5 85.7 76.4 82.4 69.1 73.5 42.5 27 15
networks prone to end up with different states, thus, making transfer rate lower. To max-
imize the benefit of the cascade adversarial training, use of the same initialization for a
cascade network and a source network (used for iterative adversarial examples generation)
is desired.
5.7.2 White Box Attack Analysis
A network trained with Kurakin’s method and that with pivot loss is first compared. 110-
layer ResNet models with/without pivot loss are trained and accuracies are reported in Table
5.5. As shown in the table, the proposed low-level similarity learning further improves
robustness against iterative attacks compared to Kurakin’s adversarial training. However,
the accuracy improvements against iterative attacks (iter FGSM, CW) are limited, showing
regularization effect of low-level similarity learning is not sufficient for the iterative attacks
on complex color images like CIFAR10. This is different from MNIST test cases where
significant accuracy increase is observed for iterative attacks only with pivot loss. Label
leaking phenomenon reported in [24] happens even though the network is not trained with
step FGSM images.
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Next, A network is trained from scratch with iter FGSM examples crafted from the de-
fended network, R110P . Initialization used in R110P is also used as discussed in 5.7.1. In
particular, iter FGSM images are crafted from R110P with CIFAR10 training images for
ε= 1,2, ..., 16, and those are used randomly together with step ll examples from the net-
work being trained. Cascade networks are trained with/without pivot loss. Networks with
ensemble adversarial training [80] are also trained with/without pivot loss for comparison.
The implementation details for the trained models can be found in Appendix A.1.
Several meaningful observations are found in Table 5.5. First, ensemble and cascade
models show improved accuracy against iterative attack although at the expense of de-
creased accuracy for one-step attacks compared to the baseline defended network (R110K).
Additional data augmentation from other networks enhances the robustness against itera-
tive attack, weakening label leaking effect caused by one-step adversarial training.
Second, the proposed low-level similarity learning (R110P,E , R110P,C) further en-
hances robustness against iterative attacks including fully unknown CW attack (especially
for ε=4). Additional knowledge learned from data augmentation through cascade/ensemble
adversarial training enables networks to learn partial knowledge of perturbations generated
by an iterative method. And the learned iterative perturbations become regularized further
with the low-level similarity learning making networks robust against unknown iterative
attacks.
Third, low-level similarity learning serves as a good regularizer for adversarial images,
but not for the clean images for ensemble/cascade models (reduced accuracy for the clean
images for R110P,E and R110P,C in Table 5.5). Compared to pure adversarial training
with one-step adversarial examples, the network sees more various adversarial perturba-
tions during training as a result of ensemble and cascade training. Those perturbations are
prone to end up embeddings in the vicinity of decision boundary more often than pertur-
bations caused by one-step adversarial training. Pivot loss pulls the vicinity of those ad-
versarial embeddings toward their corresponding clean embeddings. During this process,
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Table 5.6: CIFAR10 test results (%) for 110-layer ResNet models under black box attacks
(ε=16). {Target: same networks in Table 5.5 and R110K : Kurakin’s, Source: re-trained
baseline, Kurakin’s, cascade and ensemble networks with/without pivot loss. Source net-
works use the different initialization from the target networks. Additional details of the
models can be found in Appendix A.1.}
Target
Source: iter FGSM
R1102 R110K2 R110E2 R110P2 R110K,C2 R110P,E2 R110P,C2
R110K 70.5 73.2 27.9 77.0 67.3 54.6 80.8
R110E 77.9 79.5 55.8 79.0 68.2 54.7 82.7
R110P (Proposed) 75.9 75.6 39.6 78.5 68.3 61.3 83.3
R110K,C (Proposed) 56.4 80.2 61.1 79.5 67.4 62.6 82.1
R110P,E (Proposed) 78.2 82.1 67.7 81.7 73.4 68.4 83.8
R110P,C (Proposed) 71.9 80.4 63.9 80.1 71.1 64.2 83.0
clean embeddings from other classes might also be moved toward the decision boundary
which results in decreased accuracy for the clean images.
5.7.3 Black Box Attack Analysis
In this section, black box attack analysis is presented for the cascade/ensemble networks
with/without pivot loss. Black box attack accuracy is reported with the source networks
trained with the same method, but with different initialization from the target networks.
The reason for this is adversarial examples transfer well between networks trained with
the same strategy as observed in section 5.3.1. 110-layer ResNet models are re-trained us-
ing Kurakin’s, cascade and ensemble adversarial training with/without low-level similarity
learning. Those networks are used as source networks for black-box attacks. Baseline 110-
layer ResNet model is also included as a source network. Target networks are the same
networks used in Table 5.5. Iter FGSM attack resulted in lower accuracy than step FGSM
attack, thus, iter FGSM attack results are reported in Table 5.6.
First, iter FGSM attack from ensemble models (R110E2, R110P,E2) is strong (results
in lower accuracy) compared to that from any other trained networks. 6 Since ensemble
6This is also observed when the source and the target networks are switched. Additional details can be
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models learn various perturbation during training, adversarial noises crafted from those
networks might be more general for other networks making them transfer easily between
defended networks.
Second, cascade adversarial training breaks chicken and egg problem. (In section 5.3.1,
the analysis shows it is efficient to use a defended network as a source network to attack
another defended network.) Even though the transferability between defended networks is
reduced for deeper networks, cascade network (R110K,C) shows worst case performance
against the attack not from a defended network, but from a purely trained network (R1102).
Possible solution to further improve the worst case robustness would be to use more than
one network as source networks (including pure/defended networks) for iter FGSM images
generation for cascade adversarial training.
Third, ensemble/cascade networks together with the low-level similarity learning (R110P,E ,
R110P,C) show better worst case accuracy under black box attack scenario. This shows that
enhancing robustness against iterative white box attack also improves robustness against it-
erative black box attack.
5.8 Summary
This chapter introduced through transfer analysis and showed iter FGSM images transfer
easily between networks trained with the same strategy. The research exploited this and
proposed cascade adversarial training, a method to train a network with iter FGSM adver-
sarial images crafted from already defended networks. The study also proposed adversarial
training regularized with a unified embedding for classification and low- level similarity
learning by penalizing distance between the clean and their corresponding adversarial em-
beddings. Combining those two techniques (low level similarity learning + cascade adver-
sarial training) with deeper networks further improved robustness against iterative attacks
for both white-box and black-box attacks.
found in Appendix A.2.
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However, there is still a gap between accuracy for the clean images and that for the
adversarial images. Improving robustness against both one-step and iterative attacks still
remains challenging since it is shown to be difficult to train networks robust for both one-
step and iterative attacks simultaneously. Future research is necessary to further improve
the robustness against iterative attack without sacrificing the accuracy for step attacks or
clean images under both white-box attack and black-box attack scenarios.
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CHAPTER 6
NOISE-ROBUST AND RESOLUTION-INVARIANT IMAGE CLASSIFICATION
6.1 Introduction
Image classification using deep learning is being widely adopted for the internet of things
(IoTs) [31, 29, 78]. For power hungry edge devices, it is critical to manage the trade-off
between energy and quality of the captured image. Region of interest (RoI) based coding
is becoming a norm for controlling the energy quality trade-off in resource constraint edge
devices [87, 88, 26]. Also, inherent image sensor noise has to be considered for success-
ful image classification for low-end devices [27]. In this chapter, all these image quality
degradation including low resolution (LR), random noise and mixed resolution (MR) in a
single image due to RoI coding are treated as pixel level perturbation. The objective of this
study is to improve the robustness of a classifier against such perturbations.
Many prior work have been studied the impact of low quality images on the image
classification. There are two ways to improve the classification accuracy. One is to re-
move such perturbation itself before performing classification. GSM [57] , KSVD [58]
and BM3D [59] are well known algorithms for denoising and there have been several ap-
proaches using deep learning as a filter for denoising [60, 61]. Super resolution can also be
applied as a pre-processing for LR images before image classification [62].
Another approach is to make image classifier robust against such image perturbation.
[63] proposed fine-tuning a classifier with LR images after training the network with high
resolution (HR) images. [64] proposed a two step training of partially coupled network
for LR image classification. [65] studied the effect of noise and image quality degradation









Figure 6.1: Use of embedding space for learning low-level similarities between clean and
perturbed images.
This work falls in the latter category and makes the following contributions. First,
utilization of embedding space for both image classification and general pixel level reg-
ularization is proposed. Inspired by the previous work [89] where adversarial noises are
regularized with a unified embedding, the embedding space are used for regularizing gen-
eral pixel level perturbations including LR, random noise and mixed resolution (MR) in a
single image, which were not considered in the earlier study [89].
Second, unlike [63, 64] in which they focused on accuracy for LR images only, this
study proposes to improve accuracy of a classifier for perturbed images while maintaining
decent accuracy for the original images. The proposed method is applied for MNIST,
CIFAR10 and ImageNet dataset considering various pixel perturbations and show improved
accuracy compared to plain data augmentation approach.
6.2 Proposed Approach
Simple way to improve robustness against image perturbation is to train a classifier with
perturbed images in addition to original images. This data augmentation approach is en-
hanced by adding simple, yet efficient regularization [89]. When training a classifier, k
perturbed images are created using clean images and a mini-batch of size m is formulated
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including both perturbed images and their corresponding clean images. The pairs of these
images are injected during training. Un-normalized logits (embeddings) right before the
softmax layer are used for both image classification and low-level pixel similarity learning.
Standard cross entropy loss is used for image classification after the soft max layer and
distance based loss is used for regularization of pixel value perturbation. In particular, the
distance between clean and perturbed embeddings (resulted from the clean and perturbed
images respectively) is minimized as shown in Figure 6.1. The intuition behind the use of
distance based loss is to let the classifier aware of the pairs of two embeddings are from
the same original images. This additional regularization promotes the classifier to ignore
the pixel noises (difference between perturbed images and the original images). The entire
procedure is described in algorithm 3.
The total loss if formulated as follows.
Loss =
1
(m− k) + λk
(Lorg + λLperturb) + λ2Ldist (6.1)
where, Lorg is the classification loss for the original images, Lperturb is the classification
loss for the perturbed images, Ldist is the distance based loss between the pairs of original
and perturbed images. m is the size of the mini batch, k (≤ m/2) is the number of per-
turbed images in the mini batch. λ is the parameter to control the relative weight of the
classification loss for perturbed images. λ2 is the parameter to control the relative weight














Algorithm 3 Image classification with pixel level regularization
m: size of mini batch, k: size of perturbed images
Require: k ≤ m/2
1: repeat
2: Get mini batch B = {X1, ..., Xm−k}.
3: Generate k perturbed examples {X ′1, ..., X ′k} from corresponding original exam-
ples {X1, ..., Xk}.
4: Make new mini batch B′ = {X ′1, ..., X ′k, X1, ..., Xm−k}.
5: Perform one step forward pass with B′.
6: Formulate the cross entropy loss with entire embeddings
{E ′1, ..., E ′k, E1, ..., Em−k}.
7: Formulate the distance based loss with perturbed embeddings {E ′1, ..., E ′k} and cor-
responding original embeddings {E1, ..., Ek}.
8: Perform one step backward pass and update the parameters in N .
9: until training converged
where, X ′i is i’th perturbed image generated from i’th original image Xi. Ei and E
′
i
are the resulting embeddings from Xi and X ′i respectively. Pivot loss introduced in [89]
is used where the gradient back propagation is not performed through original embeddings
E. Additional details can be found in [89].
6.3 Experimental Results
6.3.1 MNIST and CIFAR10
20-layer ResNet (Table 6 in [3]) model is used for MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. The
image values are scaled down to [0,1] for both dataset and subtracted by per-pixel mean
values only for CIFAR10. 32x32 random crop and random flip are performed on zero
padded 40x40 original images for CIFAR10. Networks are trained with λ = 0.3, λ2 =
0.0001, m = 128, k = 64 for the experiments. Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimizer
with momentum of 0.9, weight decay of 0.0001 are used. Training is started with a learning
rate of 0.1. The learning rate is then divided by 10 at 4k and 6k iterations for MNIST, and
48k and 72k iterations for CIFAR10. Training is terminated at 8k iterations for MNIST,
and 94k iterations for CIFAR10.
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Table 6.1: Test accuracy (%) for Gaussian noise on MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. (Clean,
Noisy / Pivot loss) are trained with max σ = 0.15. Higher accuracy among (Ours) and
(Clean, Noisy) is emphasized in bold.
MNIST
Training clean σ = 0.15
Clean only 99.6 40.9
Noisy only 99.5 99.5
Clean, Noisy 99.6 99.4
Pivot loss (Ours) 99.5 99.5
CIFAR10
Training clean σ = 0.05 σ = 0.15
Clean only 91.6 62.4 16.6
Noisy only 89.8 88.9 82.0
Clean, Noisy 90.5 89.1 80.7
Pivot loss (Ours) 90.8 89.6 81.7
Random Noise
Gaussian noise is used as an example of random noise. During training, Gaussian noise
N (µ = 0, σ2) is generated where σ is selected randomly in the interval [0, max σ] per
each image. The noises are added to the images, and the resulting images are clipped with
the range [0,1]. Networks are trained by injecting those noisy images and clean images
with/without pivot loss. Standard training with clean images and only with noisy images
are included for comparison.
Table 6.1 shows test accuracy for MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. As expected, injecting
noisy images during training improves accuracy for noisy images at test time compared to
training only with clean images (Clean only) for both MNIST and CIFAR10. For simple
images like MNIST, the pivot loss doesn’t show any meaningful difference compared to
data augmentation approach (Clean, Noisy) or training with noisy images only case (Noisy
only).
Training only with noisy images: for CIFAR10 dataset, training only with noisy im-
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ages (Noisy only) shows best accuracy for noisy images with higher σ (σ=0.15), however,
at the expense of decreased accuracy for the clean images. It is natural that the network
trained with noisy images perform well for the noisy images, but not for the clean images.
Careful selection of σ is necessary when Gaussian noise is used as a data augmentation for
the clean images since larger noise actually decreases accuracy for the clean images.
Training with clean and noisy images: (Clean, Noisy / Pivot loss) show good com-
promise between training only with clean images (Clean only) and with noisy images
(Noisy only). The pivot loss only increase accuracy for both clean and noisy images com-
pared to pure data augmentation approach. This shows that additional loss with a unified
embedding results in better regularization than training only with augmented data when
dealing with pixel level perturbation.
Low Resolution
LR images are generated with sub-sampling factors of either 2 or 4. After down-sampling,
those images are up-sampled with ‘nearest’ or ‘bicubic’ method. Randomly chosen sub-
sampling factor and up-sampling method are used per each image during training. Result-
ing LR images together with the clean high resolution (HR) images are injected during
training with/without pivot loss. Again, networks are trained with clean images and with
LR images for comparison.
Table 6.2 shows test accuracy of the trained networks for clean and LR images. In
this case as well, as expected, training with LR images improves accuracy for LR images
compared to training only with clean images (Clean only) on both MNIST and CIFAR10.
Training only with LR images: for MNIST, training only with LR images (LR only)
results in good accuracy for clean images as well as LR images. This is because MNIST
LR images have good enough features that can be well generalized for clean HR images.
For complex images like CIFAR10, however, training only with LR images (LR only)
degrades accuracy for clean HR images since LR images lose features that are necessary
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Table 6.2: Test accuracy (%) for LR images (sub-sampling = x4) on MNIST and CIFAR10
dataset. For CIFAR10 dataset, 110-layer ResNet models are also trained to analyze the
effect of pivot loss for deeper networks. Higher accuracy among (Ours) and (Clean, LR) is
emphasized in bold.
MNIST
Training clean x4 (nearest) x4 (bicubic)
Clean only 99.6 50.4 57.5
LR only 99.5 87.6 86.4
Clean, LR 99.6 86.8 86.0
Pivot loss (Ours) 99.6 87.1 86.2
CIFAR10
Training clean x4 (nearest) x4 (bicubic)
20-L, Clean only 91.6 19.2 19.9
20-L, LR only 86.9 75.9 72.9
20-L, Clean, LR 91.7 71.5 70.7
20-L, Pivot loss (Ours) 92.0 73.5 72.7
110-L, Clean only 93.5 21.9 15.7
110-L, LR only 86.4 78.8 77.0
110-L, Clean, LR 93.8 76.4 76.2
110-L, Pivot loss (Ours) 93.3 78.1 77.4
for HR image classification. In all cases, accuracy for LR images is not close to that for
clean images due to the loss of features in LR images.
Training with clean and LR images: interestingly, networks trained with both clean
and LR images (Clean, LR / Pivot loss) show better accuracy improvements for both clean
and LR images compared to the network trained with clean images (Clean only). This
suggests that data augmentation with LR images serves as a good regularizer for the clean
images as well. However, (Clean, LR / Pivot loss) show decreased accuracy for LR images
compared to (LR only). This is because the network trained only with LR images has seen
more LR images during training, thus, performs better for LR images. Again, the pivot loss
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Figure 6.2: Generation of mixed resolution (MR) in a single image. Blue box and red box
in the original image represent random crop area and bounding box respectively.
Deeper networks: Test the accuracies for 110-layer ResNet models on CIFAR10
dataset are presented to study the effect of training both with clean and LR images for
deeper networks. As seen from the Table 6.2, data augmentation with 110-layer ResNet
improves accuracy for both original and LR images compared to 20-layer counter part.
The pivot loss increases accuracy for LR images compared to data augmentation approach,
however, not for the clean images. The experiments show that the pivot loss is always
a good regularizer for LR images, however, it is sometimes good or bad regularizer for
the clean images. Thus, it is recommended to use distance based loss when the focus is
to improve the accuracy of LR images while maintaining good enough accuracy for the
original images.
6.3.2 ImageNet
18-layer ResNet (Table 1 in [3]) model is used for ImageNet [90] classification. The im-
age values are scaled down to [0,1] and subtracted by per-channel mean values. Random
crop (0.5 < area range < 0.8) and random flip are performed on original images, and the
resulting images are resized to 244x244. Training is started with a learning rate of 0.1. The
learning rate is then divided by 10 at 500k, 800k and 1M iterations. Training is terminated
at 1.1M iterations. First, a network is trained only with clean images.
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Table 6.3: Test accuracy (%) for MR and LR images (sub-sampling = x4) on ImageNet
dataset. Higher accuracy among (Ours) and (Clean, MR, LR) is emphasized in bold.
Training clean MR x4 (nearest) LR x4 (nearest)
Clean only 68.1 57.8 29.3
Clean, MR, LR 67.9 61.5 44.9
Pivot loss (Ours) 67.4 62.1 49.0
Mixed Resolution in a Single Image
To see the effect of region of interest (RoI) based encoding on image classification, mixed
resolution (MR) in a single image is considered as in Figure 6.2. Ground truth bounding
boxes are used to create MR images for training. Region-based fully convolutional network
(R-FCN) [91] with ResNet-101 trained on MS-COCO dataset [92] is used for bounding box
generation on validation data set at test time. 1 Fining-tuning is performed on the baseline
network with clean, MR and LR images for 400k iterations with a learnin rate of 1e-5
with/without pivot loss. λ = 0.3, λ2 = 0.0001, m = 64 and k = 32 (16 for LR, 16 for MR)
are used for the experiments.
Table 6.3 shows accuracy results for MR and LR images. Pivot loss shows better ac-
curacy for MR and LR images compared to data augmentation approach (Clean, MR, LR)
at the expense of small accuracy decrease on the clean images. This shows that pivot loss
serves as a good regularizer for images with various resolution including MR and LR on
ImageNet dataset. This result is also consistent with the LR case study for deeper networks
on CIFAR10 dataset. As long as resolution and noise are concerned for image classifica-
tion, the pivot loss can be a simple, yet efficient regularizer for perturbed images while
maintaining decent accuracy for the clean images.
1Since ImageNet validation dataset doesn’t have bounding boxes, R-FCN is used just for bounding box
generation and observe decent quality of bounding box generation.
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6.4 Summary
The use of embedding space for both image classification and pixel level regularization is
proposed for various types of image perturbation. Image perturbation that can be happen
in practical IoT scenario (random noise, LR and MR due to RoI based coding) are consid-
ered as examples of image perturbation. Image classification results on MNIST, CIFAR10
and ImageNet dataset showed promising results when proposed pivot loss is used as an
additional regularization compared to the baseline data augmentation approach.
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CHAPTER 7
NOISE-ROBUST AND RESOLUTION-INVARIANT OBJECT DETECTION
7.1 Introduction
Region of interest (RoI) based image processing enables efficient information retrieval and
resource utilization on edge devices. The system takes inputs from sensors and processes
the data to extract the meaningful information for pre-defined objectives. Recent years have
shown exponential growth in spatial and temporal resolutions of image sensors, thanks to
innovative technologies like digital pixels, resulting in large volume of sensor data [93].
The future advancements of sensors promise much higher image quality as well as unprece-
dented controllability of the camera parameters [56]. However, limited data transmission
bandwidth between sensor and processor and available power creates a gap between max-
imum rates of data generation and consumption. Therefore, efficient control of sensors to
manage the data generation while maintaining high quality of useful information is crucial
for successful deployment of smart sensor nodes.
This chapter presents an adaptive camera module with deep neural network (DNN)
based feedback control of sensor parameters to enhance quality of information content
while limiting the sensor data. The adaptive camera module is used for real-time object
detection and tracking system where the DNN-based feedback is used to locally adapt the
spatial and/or temporal resolution of the image sensor to reduce maintain detection/tracking
accuracy while using much lower volume of sensor data. However, when a vanilla object
detection network is used for feedback, the multiple resolution and potentially, noisy im-
ages from the sensor leads to unstable behavior of the closed loop and degrade accuracy.
To address this challenge, a light-weight mixture of pre-processing experts (MoPE) model
is proposed as a pre-processing for object detection network. The variance of the input
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images for the object detection network is minimized by applying different pre-processing
experts for different images.
The prior efforts have proposed adaptive control of camera parameters such as expo-
sure, gain, illumination, based on entropy, gradient etc. [94, 95, 96, 97]. However, the
past efforts did not introduce DNN-based feedback in the control loop. Likewise, data aug-
mentation and denoising techniques for robustness have been used, but at the expense of
reduced detection accuracy for clean images [98]. Mixture of experts can be used with the
gating network which discriminates input distributions and multiple object detection net-
works trained with images from different distributions [99, 100]. The model requires large
memory for each expert, thus, it is impractical to use on the edge devices.
In contrast to the prior works, the research in this chapter makes following key contri-
butions:
1. An adaptive camera algorithm is proposed for spatial/temporal resolution control based
on DNN-based feedback enabling user-dependent determination of useful information.
2. The effect of pixel-level perturbation on the accuracy of DNN-based feedback control
has been analyzed.
3. A robust object detection DNN using light-weight mixture of pre-processing experts has
been proposed.
4. The proposed closed-loop system demonstrates high detection and tracking accuracy
even under noise while managing data generation and transmission from the sensor.
Experimental results show that the proposed network achieves better detection/tracking
accuracy for noisy images than the baseline network trained only with data augmentation,
while maintaining accuracy under clean conditions.
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7.2 Related Work
Camera parameter control: controlling camera parameters (like exposure or gain) based
on image entropy was proposed in [94]. Shim et al. [95] used a gradient information based
method to auto-adjust camera exposure. In [96], authors proposed an active control of
illumination, shutter speed and voltage gain to improve the accuracy of object detection al-
gorithms. In this chapter, a different approach that controls spatial and temporal resolution
is applied to improve object detection and tracking accuracy while reducing the bandwidth
usage. Wang et al. [97] recently proposed a two-stage framework with variable resolution
control that uses low resolution image for object detection and high resolution image for
object recognition.
Object detection with noisy images: several image denoising algorithms exist in the
literature[101, 102, 103]. Milani et al. [104] proposed a much simpler adaptive filtering
strategy for Histogram of Oriented Gradients(HOG) based object detection in noisy images.
Recently, convolutional neural network (CNN) based object detection with noisy images
is proposed in [105]. They used an adaptive bilateral filter that considers local texture
properties to decide the amount of intensity smoothing required. They also showed the
ability of CNN to adapt with image noise by re-training it with noisy images. However,
they have not reported how this re-trained network performs with clean images with or
without pre-processing. Applying pre-processing on every image has shown to degrade the
detection accuracy for the clean images (Section 7.7). The proposed MoPE uses gating
network which discriminates clean and noisy images and applies pre-processing only for
noisy images.
7.3 Object Detection Background
Object detection is the problem of finding and classifying a number of objects in a single
image. In contrast with problems like classification, the number of outputs can be varied
89
depending on how many objects are in an image. Types of the objects are not single one
unlike classification problem. Multiple objects in multiple locations in an single images
are need to be detected and classified.
Various methods use CNNs as backbone networks like image classification, however,
many post processing elements are necessary to to produce set of bounding box and its cor-
responding class score. Faster R-CNN [106] is famous among the various object detection
networks as it achieves state of the art detection performance and computationally efficient.
7.3.1 Faster R-CNN
Faster R-CNN uses unified feature extractor for both bounding box generation and image
classification. Common choice of the feature extractor is CNN, and the output features are
used in another CNN called region proposal network (RPN) to generate bounding box pro-
posals. Based on the results from the RPN, the output of the feature extractor are cropped
and fed into image classifier to get the class score.
7.3.2 Performance Metric
Performance measurement of the object detection can be done by calculating mean average





where the area of overlap is computed between the predicted bounding box and the
ground-truth bounding box, and area of union is the area encompassed by both the predicted
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Figure 7.1: Faster R-CNN architecture [106] trained with similarity loss [89]
Table 7.1: Mean Average Precision @ IoU=0.5 on MS-COCO 2014 validation dataset.
Faster R-CNN architecture [106] with inception v2 [107] as a backbone network is used. σ
: standard deviation for Gaussian noise when the image values are in [0,1]. max σ = 0.15
is used during training
mAP @ IoU=0.5
Training Similarity loss Clean σ = 0.15
Clean+Noisy - 0.458 0.305
Clean+Noisy X 0.457 0.306
proposal was made for class c and there actually was an object of class c. The number of
false positives, #FP (c), is the number of occurrences that the proposal was made for class
c and there is no object of class c. Objectness in the predicted bounding box is determined







7.4 Effect of low level similarity learning for Faster R-CNN
Similarity learning as in Chapter 6 can also be applied to object detection problem. Figure
7.1 shows how to apply similarity loss for Faster R-CNN network as an example object
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Figure 7.2: Object detection using active control of camera parameters
layer of the first feature extractor. The output of the first feature extractor is then used for
both region proposal network and image classifier.
To compare the effect of similarity loss for the object detection network, two faster
R-CNN networks have been trained with and without similarity loss. Table 7.1 shows that
the difference between mAPs for those networks is negligible. The results differ from the
results for the image classification task in Chapter 6. Possible explanation would be that
the similarity loss is effective only for the continuous variables and not for the discrete
variables. Even though region proposal network uses the same features with the image
classifier, generation of bounding boxes relates with many discrete components including
anchors and number of region proposals etc. And the object detection accuracy is deter-
mined based on the results from both region proposal network and image classifier.
7.5 Proposed Approach
The proposed object tracking system with image sensor, object detection network and feed-
back control unit is shown in Figure 7.2. The objective of the system is to extract the
meaningful information for the target application (in this case, object tracking) from the
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Figure 7.3: Mixed Resolution Sensor Model
controllable image sensor with optimized system bandwidth. Once an image from the
sensor is obtained, object detection network produces the bounding boxes and confidence
scores for each class. The control unit changes the spatial and temporal resolution of the
image for the next frame. To be stable, enhancing the robustness of the object detection
network for the noisy and low resolution images is necessary.
7.5.1 Spatio-Temporal Resolution Control
Sensor parameters in the camera is controlled to optimize the ratio of information to raw
data sent by the sensor to the end application. An object detection network performs de-
tection on the incoming image frames. Spatial resolution of the subsequent frames is then
controlled by keeping regions of the image containing ROI at a higher resolution and de-
creasing resolution for non-ROI regions. Decreasing quality in the non-ROI regions is
modeled as an averaging operation with the same pixel value copied for a specified grid of
N x N pixels. The mixed resolution image model is presented in Figure 7.3.
Due to non-zero latency between feedback applied at the sensor and feedback genera-
tion from the network, there is a chance that objects under observation may fall partially
under low resolution regions or be completely missed in the subsequent frames. An ROI
prediction module is added to offset the detections from the object detection network to
compensate for these latencies. Object tracking algorithm presented by Bewley et al is
utilized for the ROI prediction problem [108].
The ROI prediction module uses multiple Kalman filters with a linear motion model.
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Each of these predictors correspond to a unique detection from the object detection mod-
ule. They are used for predicting likely locations of the object in the successive frames.
Since the output of the object detector is stateless, an association module associates past
predictors with current detections. For the association module, The Hungarian algorithm
is used for bipartite graph matching with the IoU between predictions and detections as
the cost for optimization. The ROI prediction module allows recovery in case of missed
detections in between frames and ensures that objects of interest are always transmitted at
the highest quality.
Using the same framework as above, temporal resolution control is done by using the
output of the object detection itself to guide the acquisition of input images. Sequences
are sampled at a reduced frame rate when no objects are detected or no prior objects are
being tracked. Upon detection of objects of interest, spatial location containing object of
interest are sampled at a higher rate. The proposed approach enables to achieve similar
tracking accuracy while operating at a much reduced bandwidth conceivably conserving
sensor power and bandwidth between the sensor and the rest of the system.
7.5.2 Robust Object Detection
Reasonable amount of image distortion is useful as a regularization when the test data
distribution is expected to be in the same distribution with the training data. In this work,
the input distribution is diverse including various resolutions and noisy images. Thus,
data augmentation increases the overall detection accuracies, however, it reduces individual
accuracy compared to the network trained only on the specific data distribution. As shown
in Table 7.2, the network trained only with the clean images perform poorly on the low
resolution and noisy images. The network trained with clean, low resolution and noisy
images improves detection accuracy for low resolution and noisy images compared to the
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Figure 7.4: Gating network architecture
Mixture of pre-processing experts (MoPE)
To tackle this problem, a light-weight MoPE model is used to incorporate various input
distributions. Each pre-processing expert is trained on the target input distribution like low
resolution or noisy images and used as a pre-processing for the object detection network.
Pre-processing unit trained on each data distribution minimizes the variance of the input
distribution seen by the object detection network. A gating network is used to discriminate
the input distribution whether the image is clean or noisy as shown in Figure 7.2. The
gating network selects an input image for the object detection network among the output
candidate images from pre-processing units.
Gating network: 31x31 modified PatchGAN [109] is used for the gating network
as Gaussian noise in nature is easy to identify in a relatively small region. As shown in
Figure 7.4, 3x3 kernels for convolution layers and instance normalization [110] are used as
building blocks. Shallower network is used to minimize the burden of using pre-processing.
Pre-processing for the clean and low-resolution images: No preprocessing is used
for the high-resolution images and up-sampled version of low resolution images. As the
objective of using the mixture of the preprocessing units was to develop a computationally
efficient architecture, data augmentation was sufficient to enhance the robustness against
high-resolution and low-resolution images.
Pre-processing for the noisy images: An average filter and denoise auto-encoder
network have been considered as a candidate pre-processing for the noisy images. Aver-
age filter was very powerful preprocessor for the noisy images considering its simpleness,
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Figure 7.6: Training framework for denoise network with similarity and adversarial loss
work [111] as shown in Figure 7.5. Simple architecture is used intentionally to reduce
the computational complexity. All the convolution and transposed convolution have 3x3
kernels, and the number of filters increases/decreases by 2 when the features are down/up
sampled with stride 2. As the denoise network is pixel to pixel transformation between
similar images, skip connection helps preserve the color information in original images,
thus, eventually produce better quality. Average filter in front reduces the random noise
in images at the expense of loss the edge information. 1 Loss of the edge information is
recovered by training denoise network with adversarial loss [112] which will be discussed
in the following section.
Training objectives
Denoise network: Adversarial loss [112] is used on top of the similarity loss (L2 loss) as
shown in Figure 7.6 for realistic denoising. For the noise function F : X → Y and denoise
1Denoise network without average filter showed slight decreased accuracy.
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function G : Y → X and its discriminator D, the objective is:
LGAN(G,D|F ) = Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)] + Ey∼pdata(y)[log(1−D(G(y)))], (7.1)
where G aims to generate images G(y) that look similar to images from clean data
distribution X , while D tries to distinguish between denoised images G(y) and the original
images x for a given noise function y = F (x).
Similarity loss is added to encourage the denoised images G(F (x)) to be similar to the
original images x:
Lsim(G|F ) = ||G(F (x))− x||22. (7.2)
The total objective is:
L(G,D|F ) = LGAN(G,D|F ) + λLsim(G|F ), (7.3)
where λ controls the relative importance of the two objectives. λ = 1 is used in the






Gating network: Softmax function is used for the gating network as this is the clas-
sification problem. For the gating function H , the original images x and the noisy images
F (x), the training objective is:
LGate(H) = − log(H(x))− log(1−H(F (x))), (7.5)
where the output function of H is sigmoid function. The output of H is directly used to




Faster R-CNN [106] is used for object detection network and inception v2 [107] as a back-
bone feature extractor. Tensorflow object detection API [113] is used and modified to
integrate MoPE model. MS-COCO 2014 dataset [92] is used for training and follow the
default configuration except the learning rate schedule in [113].
Up-sampled version of the 2x and 4x low-resolution images and noisy images along
with the clean images are used as a data augmentation. Gaussian noise N (µ = 0, σ2) is
used where σ is selected randomly in the interval [0, max σ] per each image. For every
iteration, only one image is selected randomly between the clean and the low-resolution
image. The selected image is injected with the corresponding Gaussian noise added image.
Faster R-CNN is trained with stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimizer with mo-
mentum of 0.9 for 600k iterations. Training is started with a learning rate of 2e-4 and di-
vide it by 10 at 200k, 400k iterations. Denoise network and gating network is trained with
Adam optimizer for 20k iterations. For fine-tuning of faster R-CNN and MoPE model,
extra 200k iterations are used with a learning rate of 2e-6.
7.7 Experimental Results
To prove the effectiveness of the proposed approach, baseline network and network trained
with data augmentation are used for comparison. As discussed, average filter and denoise
network are considered for the pre-processing experts, and the effect of gating network is
analyzed.
7.7.1 Object Detection
Object detection accuracies on MS-COCO validation dataset are shown in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Mean Average Precision @ IoU=0.5 on MS-COCO 2014 validation dataset.
Faster R-CNN architecture [106] with inception v2 [107] as a backbone network is used.
LR: low resolution, 2x and 4x down-sampled versions are used for training and 4x down-
sampled images are used for evaluation. σ : standard deviation for gaussian noise when the
image values are in [0,1]. max σ = 0.15 is used during training
mAP @ IoU=0.5
Model Training Preprocessing Gating Fine-tune Clean LR σ = 0.15
1 Clean only - - - 0.461 0.335 0.226
2 Clean only Average filter - - 0.445 0.336 0.299
3 Clean only Average filter X - 0.457 0.335 0.298
4 Clean only Denoise - - 0.449 0.335 0.324
5 Clean only Denoise X - 0.457 0.335 0.323
6 Clean+LR+Noisy - - - 0.454 0.360 0.295
7 Clean+LR+Noisy Average filter X X 0.456 0.360 0.338
8 Clean+LR+Noisy Denoise X X 0.456 0.360 0.359
Effect of pre-processing: The network trained only with the clean data shows reduced
mAP for the noisy images (model 1). Pre-processing like average filter or denoise network
(model 2 and model 4) increases mAP for the noisy images. Denoise network performs
better than average filter at the cost of extra computation. For the clean images, however,
pre-processing decreases mAP as additional processing on the clean images degrades input
feature information.
Effect of gating network: Gating network trained in isolation is used together with
pre-processing unit to analyze the effect of gating network. Model 3 and 5 in Table 7.2
show recovered mAP for the clean images as gating network guides the clean images not
to be pre-processed. Eventually, the mAP for the clean images becomes similar with the
baseline model (model 1).
Effect of MoPE: The proposed methods are compared with the network trained with
data augmentation. The network trained with various input images show improved mAP
for the low resolution and noisy images (model 6) compared to the baseline network (model
1).
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(a) Clean image (b) Pre-processed clean 
image after MoPE
(c) Noisy image (d) Pre-processed noisy 
image after MoPE
Figure 7.7: Sample images after the MoPE layer for the model 8 in Table 7.2
Next, the baseline network (model 1) together with pre-trained gating network and
denoise network is fine-tuned. When fine-tuning, the loss functions used in training the
gating network and the denoise network are not used. Classification and box regression
losses are only used in fine-tuning. The same data augmentation used for training model 6
is applied.
The proposed MoPE models (model 7 and 8) only improve mAP for the noisy images
compare to the data augmented network (model 6). Gating network allows no-preprocessing
for the clean and low-resolution images and injection of average filtered/denoised images
during training further improves performance for the noisy images. Denoise network per-
forms better than average filter with a small increase in computation. Sample images after
the MoPE layer for the model 8 are shown in Figure 7.7. As intended, the clean image
is not affected by the denoise network and the noisy image is denoised with the denoise
network.
7.7.2 Object Tracking
Experimental evaluation was performed on the MOT-Challenge Dataset which is primarily
targeted towards multi-object tracking [114]. Experiments on the train set which contains
7 sequences with varying lengths are performed. 6 sequences have resolution 1920 x 1080
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Table 7.3: Tracking accuracy on MOT17 Train Set. Faster R-CNN [106] with inception v2
[107] backbone network
MOTA
Network No Feedback Feedback Feedback + σ = 0.15
Model 1 0.444 0.438 0.373
Model 6 0.440 0.432 0.401
Model 7 0.442 0.437 0.405
Model 8 0.442 0.433 0.428
(a) Noisy image @ t=0 (b) Prediction with low 
resolution image @ t=0
(c) Mixed resolution image 
with feedback @ t=1
(d) Prediction with mixed 
resolution image @ t=1
Figure 7.8: Sample images with feedback control under noisy condition for the model 8 in
Table 7.2
while one has a resolution of 640 x 480. It is a challenging dataset with multiple targets to
track, occlusion effects, background clutter. 4 sequences are shot from a moving platform
while the rest are filmed using static cameras.
All models in 3 different configurations are evaluated. In the baseline configuration, no
feedback control is applied to modify the parameters of the video sequence. In the feed-
back configuration, spatio-temporal control is applied to sample the video at variable frame
rates and variable resolution within the frame itself. In the feedback + noise configuration,
Gaussian noise with σ = 0.15 is applied at every input sampled frame. For reproducibility
and consistency across the models, same seed for the random number generation is used
before each sequence. The main metric of interest is multiple object tracking accuracy
(MOTA) and the average bandwidth consumed for transmitting the sequences.
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Table 7.4: Bandwidth Consumption on MOT17 Train Set. Faster R-CNN [106] with incep-
tion v2 [107] backbone network
Average Bandwidth (Mbit/s)
Network No Feedback Feedback Feedback + σ = 0.15
Model 1 1311 378 333
Model 6 1311 382 363
Model 7 1311 379 377
Model 8 1311 374 383
Object tracking accuracy: The MOTA metric is a combined metric for evaluating
three types of tracking errors i.e. false negatives, false positives and ID switches normalized
by the number of ground truths within the sequence.
MOTA = (1−
∑
i(fni + fpi + idi)∑
i gi
) ∗ 100 (7.6)
MOTA results are presented in Table 7.3. Feedback control slightly degrades MOTA
results for all the cases. When Gaussian noise is added during the feedback control, MOTA
results further drops. Network trained with data augmentation (model 6) shows better
MOTA than the baseline. And the proposed method (model 7 and 8), especially for the
model 8 with denoise network, shows better MOTA compared to other models for feed-
back control and noisy condition. The results are consistent with the results in object
detection, and this proves the proposed approaches are beneficial for both object detection
and tracking. Sample images are shown for the model 8 in Figure 7.8.
Object tracking bandwidth analysis: For the bandwidth calculation, the raw pixel
count per frame is used and image/video compression techniques are used. Bandwidth
results are presented in Table 7.4. In case of feedback control without noise, the average
bandwidth can be reduced by 3x compared to the no-feedback case. Note, that even though
all models show similar reduced bandwidth results for feedback case, MOTA results show
that comparable tracking accuracy is achieved compared to no-feedback case by data aug-
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mentation and the proposed methods.
For the feedback control in noisy condition, model 1 shows further decreased band-
width than feedback case due to increased false negatives. The increased false negatives
degrade the tracking accuracy as shown in Table 7.3. The proposed method (model 8)
maintains similar bandwidth with that of feedback without noise condition while achieving
comparable tracking accuracy.
7.8 Summary
In this chapter, efficient object detection and tracking system using the feedback control
of the image sensor is presented. Noise-robust object detection network is realized with
MoPE model for reliable feedback control under noisy condition. Feedback control en-
ables reduced bandwidth allowing energy efficient operation of the system. Low resolution
and noise robust object detection network is proposed using simple yet efficient mixture of
pre-processing experts (MoPE) model. The overhead of adding gating network and denoise
network is negligible considering heavy computation of object detection network. The pro-
posed method can achieve better detection and tracking accuracy than the baseline network




This chapter summarizes the key contributions and provides future research direction.
In this thesis, techniques and algorithms have been presented to enable energy efficient,
secure and noise-robust deep learning for the internet of things (IoTs). Dynamic precision
scaling (DPS) and flexible multiply-accumulator (MAC) units for speeding up convolu-
tional neural networks (CNNs) training have been proposed. Low precision training for
recurrent neural networks (RNNs) has been enabled by fine-tuning of hyper parameters.
Cascade adversarial training and low-level similarity learning have been proposed to en-
hance robustness against adversarial attacks. Noise-robust and resolution-invariant image
classification has been realized by applying pixel level similarity learning, and mixture
of pre-processing experts (MoPE) model has been proposed to enable noise-robust object
detection.
Chapter 3 presented an algorithm to speed up CNNs training by applying DPS. DPS
utilizes dynamic fixed point format as a compromise between traditional fixed point and
floating point format. DPS tries to find good enough low precision for training, not neces-
sarily minimum precision for given network and data set. Once the integer part bit width
allocation is done for each layer and neuron, DPS start finding good enough low precision
by aggressively lowering precision. Moving average loss is used to determine dynamic pre-
cision search. Precision flexible MAC has been presented to show feasibility of speeding
up of CNNs training when it is used together with DPS. Future work will include entire
system level analysis for the real world platform to estimate actual benefit of using DPS
and and flexible MAC.
Chapter 4 introduced comparative study of entire limited precision training of RNNs.
Performance analysis of low precision hardware for RNN has also been presented. The key
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observations from this study include: (1) batch normalization is essential even for RNNs
training, (2) 64-bit fixed point is not sufficient for training RNNs, (3) careful selection for
the overflow rate is critical when using dynamic fixed point format, (4) stochastic round-
ing is powerful for low precision training, (5) gradient accumulation for the weights if
more important than any other path, (6) piecewise linear activation together with stochastic
rounding works pretty well. The low precision MAC with stochastic rounding has been
implemented and showed 4.7x faster and 4.55x energy efficient training. The future work
would be to extend this work to generalize for deeper layer RNNs training.
In chapter 5, techniques to enhance robustness against adversarial attacks have been
presented. Unified embedding space is utilized for both classification and low-level (pixel-
level) similarity learning to ignore unknown pixel level perturbation. During training, ad-
versarial images are injected without replacing their corresponding clean images and the
distance between the two embeddings (clean and adversarial) is penalized. This additional
regularization encourages two similar images (clean and perturbed versions) to produce the
same outputs, not necessarily the true labels, enhancing classifier’s robustness against pixel
level perturbation. The study also showed that iteratively generated adversarial images
easily transfered between networks trained with the same strategy. Inspired by this obser-
vation, cascade adversarial training has been proposed which transfers the knowledge of the
end results of adversarial training. Cascade adversarial training injects iteratively generated
adversarial images crafted from already defended networks in addition to one-step adver-
sarial images from the network being trained. Experimental results showed that cascade
adversarial training together with the proposed low-level similarity learning efficiently en-
hanced the robustness against iterative attacks, but at the expense of decreased robustness
against one-step attacks. The study showed that combining those two techniques could also
improve robustness under the worst case black box attack scenario. However, there is still
a gap between accuracy for the clean images and that for the adversarial images. Improv-
ing robustness against both one-step and iterative attacks still remains challenging since
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it is shown to be difficult to train networks robust for both one-step and iterative attacks
simultaneously. Future research is necessary to further improve the robustness against it-
erative attack without sacrificing the accuracy for step attacks or clean images under both
white-box attack and black-box attack scenarios.
In chapter 6, an algorithm for noise-robust and resolution-invariant image classification
has been proposed. Pixel-level pair-wise similarity learning has been applied to enhance
the classification accuracy for both the clean and perturbed images. The proposed approach
uses pair of clean and perturbed images during training, and minimize the distance between
the two embeddings. Gaussian noise added images, low resolution or mixed resolution
images are studied as examples of pixel level perturbation to prove the effectiveness of the
algorithm. Image classification results on MNIST, CIFAR10 and ImageNet dataset showed
promising results when the networks are trained with the proposed approach. Still there is
a gap between the accuracy for the clean images and that for the perturbed images, thus, the
future work is necessary to further enhance the accuracy for the perturbed images without
sacrificing accuracies for the perturbed images.
Chapter 7 presented techniques to enable noise-robust and resolution-invariant object
detection. To this end, light weight MoPE model has been proposed to decrease the input
variance seen by the object detection network. The data distribution for the original images
and that for the noisy images become similar by applying specific pre-processing expert per
each distribution. In particular, for noisy images, adversarially regularized auto-encoder
network is used to denoise Gaussian noise added in the images. Skip connections in the
network helps preserve the color information in the original images. Adversarial loss and
the L2 distance loss are used to train the network. Fine-tuning the MoPE model and object
detection network further improved the detection and tracking accuracy. Future work is
necessary to further enhance detection accuracy for both clean and perturbed images.
Future of deep learning and the IoT is very promising, however, there are many chal-
lenges yet to be addressed. Today’s deep learning advances have promised that getting
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more data is crucial for the success of deep learning. However, collecting the data is not
that simple. The data is distributed in an unorganized way and the privacy concerns pro-
hibit the data collection from the edge devices. Use of edge devices for training might be
the possible solution to address this challenge. Efficient training on the edge devices, thus,
has to be studied to enable better model while preserving the user privacy.
Also, deep learning no longer has to be treated as a black box. Deep learning deploy-
ment has to be careful especially for the safe critical applications like autonomous driving
car. Adoption of deep learning might be hindered if the technology doesn’t fully explain
the underlying mechanism. Understandable, robust and uncertainty reduced deep learning





IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS IN CHAPTER 5
A.1 Model Descriptions
The model names used in Chapter 5 are summarized in Table A.1. For ensemble adversarial
training, pre-trained networks as in Table A.3 together with the network being trained are
used to generate one-step adversarial examples during training. For cascade adversarial
training, pre-trained defended networks as in Table A.2 are used to generate iter FGSM
images, and the network being trained is used to generate one-step adversarial examples
during training.
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J standard training R1103
K standard training R1104
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Table A.2: Ensemble model description
Ensemble models Pre-trained models
R20E , R20P,E , R110E , R110P,E R203, R1103
R110E2, R110P,E2 R204, R1104
Table A.3: Cascade model description
Cascade models Pre-trained model
R20K,C , R20P,C R20P
R110K,C , R110P,C R110P
R110K,C2, R110P,C2 R110P2
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A.2 Additional Black Box Attack Results
Table A.4: CIFAR10 test results (%) under black box attacks between the network with the
same initialization (ε=16)}
Target
Source: step FGSM Source: iter FGSM
R20 R20K R20P R20 R20K R20P
R20 12.2 27.4 27.5 0.0 45.9 44.7
R20K 65.7 81.5 81.8 51.5 0.0 18.2
R20P 58.1 89.3 91.7 48.9 13.4 0.0
Table A.4 shows that black box attack between trained networks with the same initial-
ization tends to be more successful than that between networks with different initialization
as explained in [24].
Table A.5: CIFAR10 test results (%) under black box attacks for ε=16. {Target and Source
networks are switched from the Table 5.1}
Target
Source: step FGSM Source: iter FGSM
R20 R20K R20P R20 R20K R20P
R202 17.9 33.9 34.5 4.1 54.8 54.3
R20K2 65.0 84.6 84.5 61.2 25.3 30.4
R20P2 66.4 88.2 87.2 61.6 27.7 36.1
In Table A.5, the proposed method (R20P2) is always better at one-step and iterative
black box attack from defended networks (R20K , R20P ) and undefended network (R20)
than Kurakin’s method (R20B2). However, it is hard to tell which method is better than the
other one as explained in the main paper.
In Table A.6, black box attack accuracies are shown with the source and the target net-
works switched from the Table 5.6. Similar observation is found that networks trained with
both low-level similarity learning and cascade/ensemble adversarial training (R110P,C2,
R110P,E2) show better worst-case performance than other networks. Overall, iter FGSM
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Table A.6: CIFAR10 test results (%) for cascade networks under black box attacks for
ε=16. {Target and Source: Please see the model descriptions in Appendix A.1.}
Target
Source: iter FGSM
R110 R110K R110E R110P R110K,C R110P,E R110P,C
R110K2 80.5 72.7 49.3 68.0 49.6 41.0 67.9
R110E2 82.7 59.1 39.5 59.6 51.5 40.3 69.6
R110P2 (Ours) 80.3 75.9 54.2 72.2 54.9 44.3 72.4
R110K,C2 (Ours) 62.1 74.7 61.5 72.3 46.5 39.0 67.9
R110P,E2 (Ours) 81.5 79.0 50.0 77.3 56.9 45.5 75.2
R110P,C2 (Ours) 72.2 76.4 60.6 73.8 51.0 40.9 72.0
images crafted from ensemble model families (R110E , R110P,E) remain strong on the
defended networks.
A.3 Implementation Details for Carlini-Wagner L∞ Attack
Carlini and Wagner (CW) L∞ attack solves the following optimization problem for every
inputX .




such that X + δ ∈ [0, 1]n
where, the function f is defined such that attack is success if and only if f(X+δ) < 0, δ is
the target perturbation defined asXadv−X , c is the parameter to control the relative weight
of function f in the total cost function, and τ is the control threshold used to penalize any
terms that exceed τ .
Since CW L∞ attack is computationally expensive, 100 test examples are used (10 ex-
amples per each class). Adversarial examplesXadv are searched with c ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 20}
and τ ∈ {0.02, 0.04, ..., 0.6} for MNIST and c ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 1, 3, 10, 30, 100} and τ ∈
{0.001, 0.002, ..., 0.01, 0.012, ..., 0.02, 0.024, ..., 0.04, 0.048, ..., 0.08} for CIFAR10. Adam
optimizer is used with an initial learning rate of 0.01/c. Scaled version of initial learning
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Figure A.1: Cumulative distribution function vs. ε for 100 test adversarial examples gener-
ated by CW L∞ attack. Lower CDF value for a fixed ε means the better defense.
rate is used since the constant initial learning rate for c · f(X + δ) term is critical for suc-
cessful adversarial images generation. The search is terminated after 2,000 iterations for
each X , c and τ . If f(X + δ) < 0 and the resulting ||δ||∞ is lower than the current best
distance,Xadv is updated.
Figure A.1 shows cumulative distribution function of ε for 100 successful adversarial
examples per each network. The number of adversarial examples with ε > 0.3*255 for
MNIST and that with ε > 2 or 4 for CIFAR10 are reported. As seen from this figure,




[1] Y. LeCun, Y. Bengio, and G. E. Hinton, “Deep learning,” Nature, vol. 521, no. 7553,
pp. 436–444, 2015.
[2] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “Imagenet classification with deep
convolutional neural networks,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Sys-
tems 25, F. Pereira, C. J. C. Burges, L. Bottou, and K. Q. Weinberger, Eds., Curran
Associates, Inc., 2012, pp. 1097–1105.
[3] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for image recog-
nition,” in 2016 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
CVPR 2016, Las Vegas, NV, USA, June 27-30, 2016, 2016, pp. 770–778.
[4] C. Szegedy, W. Liu, Y. Jia, P. Sermanet, S. Reed, D. Anguelov, D. Erhan, V. Van-
houcke, and A. Rabinovich, “Going deeper with convolutions,” in Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition (CVPR), 2015.
[5] C. Szegedy, V. Vanhoucke, S. Ioffe, J. Shlens, and Z. Wojna, “Rethinking the in-
ception architecture for computer vision,” in CVPR, IEEE Computer Society, 2016,
pp. 2818–2826.
[6] C. Szegedy, S. Ioffe, and V. Vanhoucke, “Inception-v4, inception-resnet and the
impact of residual connections on learning,” CoRR, vol. abs/1602.07261, 2016.
[7] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman, “Very deep convolutional networks for large-scale
image recognition,” 2015.
[8] P. Arbelaez, M. Maire, C. Fowlkes, and J. Malik, “Contour detection and hierarchi-
cal image segmentation,” IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell., vol. 33, no. 5,
pp. 898–916, May 2011.
[9] K. Xu, J. Ba, R. Kiros, K. Cho, A. Courville, R. Salakhudinov, R. Zemel, and Y.
Bengio, “Show, attend and tell: Neural image caption generation with visual atten-
tion,” in Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference on Machine Learning,
F. Bach and D. Blei, Eds., ser. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, vol. 37,
Lille, France: PMLR, 2015, pp. 2048–2057.
[10] J. Devlin, R. Zbib, Z. Huang, T. Lamar, R. Schwartz, and J. Makhoul, “Fast and
robust neural network joint models for statistical machine translation,” in Proceed-
ings of the 52nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguis-
115
tics (Volume 1: Long Papers), Baltimore, Maryland: Association for Computational
Linguistics, 2014, pp. 1370–1380.
[11] J. Chung, K. Cho, and Y. Bengio, “A character-level decoder without explicit seg-
mentation for neural machine translation,” in ACL (1), The Association for Com-
puter Linguistics, 2016.
[12] I. Sutskever, O. Vinyals, and Q. V. Le, “Sequence to sequence learning with neural
networks,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, Z. Ghahra-
mani, M. Welling, C. Cortes, N. D. Lawrence, and K. Q. Weinberger, Eds., Curran
Associates, Inc., 2014, pp. 3104–3112.
[13] D. Amodei, S. Ananthanarayanan, R. Anubhai, J. Bai, E. Battenberg, C. Case, J.
Casper, B. Catanzaro, Q. Cheng, G. Chen, J. Chen, J. Chen, Z. Chen, M. Chrzanowski,
A. Coates, G. Diamos, K. Ding, N. Du, E. Elsen, J. Engel, W. Fang, L. Fan, C.
Fougner, L. Gao, C. Gong, A. Hannun, T. Han, L. Johannes, B. Jiang, C. Ju, B. Jun,
P. LeGresley, L. Lin, J. Liu, Y. Liu, W. Li, X. Li, D. Ma, S. Narang, A. Ng, S. Ozair,
Y. Peng, R. Prenger, S. Qian, Z. Quan, J. Raiman, V. Rao, S. Satheesh, D. Seetapun,
S. Sengupta, K. Srinet, A. Sriram, H. Tang, L. Tang, C. Wang, J. Wang, K. Wang,
Y. Wang, Z. Wang, Z. Wang, S. Wu, L. Wei, B. Xiao, W. Xie, Y. Xie, D. Yogatama,
B. Yuan, J. Zhan, and Z. Zhu, “Deep speech 2 : End-to-end speech recognition in
english and mandarin,” in Proceedings of The 33rd International Conference on
Machine Learning, M. F. Balcan and K. Q. Weinberger, Eds., ser. Proceedings of
Machine Learning Research, vol. 48, New York, New York, USA: PMLR, 2016,
pp. 173–182.
[14] W. Chan, N. Jaitly, Q. V. Le, and O. Vinyals, “Listen, attend and spell: A neural
network for large vocabulary conversational speech recognition,” in ICASSP, IEEE,
2016, pp. 4960–4964.
[15] V. Mnih, K. Kavukcuoglu, D. Silver, A. A. Rusu, J. Veness, M. G. Bellemare,
A. Graves, M. Riedmiller, A. K. Fidjeland, G. Ostrovski, S. Petersen, C. Beattie,
A. Sadik, I. Antonoglou, H. King, D. Kumaran, D. Wierstra, S. Legg, and D. Hass-
abis, “Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning,” Nature, vol. 518,
no. 7540, pp. 529–533, Feb. 2015.
[16] D. Silver, A. Huang, C. J. Maddison, A. Guez, L. Sifre, G. van den Driessche,
J. Schrittwieser, I. Antonoglou, V. Panneershelvam, M. Lanctot, S. Dieleman, D.
Grewe, J. Nham, N. Kalchbrenner, I. Sutskever, T. Lillicrap, M. Leach, K. Kavukcuoglu,
T. Graepel, and D. Hassabis, “Mastering the game of go with deep neural networks
and tree search,” Nature, vol. 529, no. 7587, pp. 484–489, Jan. 2016.
[17] Y. LeCun, B. E. Boser, J. S. Denker, D. Henderson, R. E. Howard, W. E. Hubbard,
and L. D. Jackel, “Handwritten digit recognition with a back-propagation network,”
116
in Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 2, D. S. Touretzky, Ed.,
Morgan-Kaufmann, 1990, pp. 396–404.
[18] S. Hochreiter and J. Schmidhuber, “Long short-term memory,” Neural Comput.,
vol. 9, no. 8, pp. 1735–1780, Nov. 1997.
[19] K. Cho, B van Merrienboer, D. Bahdanau, and Y. Bengio, “On the properties of
neural machine translation: Encoder-decoder approaches,” in Eighth Workshop on
Syntax, Semantics and Structure in Statistical Translation (SSST-8), 2014, 2014.
[20] R. Pascanu, T. Mikolov, and Y. Bengio, “On the difficulty of training recurrent neu-
ral networks,” in Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on International
Conference on Machine Learning - Volume 28, ser. ICML’13, Atlanta, GA, USA:
JMLR.org, 2013, pp. III–1310–III–1318.
[21] Y. Long, E. M. Jung, J. Kung, and S. Mukhopadhyay, “Reram crossbar based recur-
rent neural network for human activity detection,” in IJCNN, IEEE, 2016, pp. 939–
946.
[22] J. Ott, Z. Lin, Y. Zhang, S. Liu, and Y. Bengio, “Recurrent neural networks with
limited numerical precision,” CoRR, vol. abs/1608.06902, 2016.
[23] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Learning Represen-
tations (ICLR), 2015.
[24] A. Kurakin, I. J. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial machine learning at
scale,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Learning Representa-
tions (ICLR), 2017.
[25] R. Huang, B. Xu, D. Schuurmans, and C. Szepesvári, “Learning with a strong ad-
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